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THE UNDERFEDERALIZATION OF CRIME
Tom Stacy and Kim Daytont
INTRODUCTION
According to federal judges and academics, crime has been
overfederalized.1 The national government's crime fighting role has ex-
t Tom Stacy is Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of Law. B.A.,
University of Michigan, 1979; J.D., University of Michigan, 1983. His interests include civil
procedure, clinical teaching, conffict of laws, constitutional law, criminal law, and criminal
procedure. Kim Dayton is Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of Law where
she teaches courses in advanced criminal procedure, criminal procedure, civil procedure, elder
law, feminist theory, and intellectual property. B.A., University of Kansas, 1980; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1983.
1 This position has been endorsed by official organs of the federal judiciary, the Chief
Justice, and individual federal judges. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts 21-28 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]; REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMiTTEE 4-10, 35-38 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY]; William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, in THE TIRD
BRANCH 1, 3 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Jan. 1992); Sam J. Ervin, III, The
Federalization of State Crimes: Some Observations and Reflections, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 761
(1996); Letter from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Clifford J. Wallace to Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, Attorney General Janet Reno, then-Senate Judiciary Chair Joseph Biden,
and then-House Judiciary Chair Jack Brooks (Mar. 29, 1993), reprinted in Marshall, infra, at
738 (Appendix A) [hereinafter Wallace letter]; Robert E. Cowen, Federalization of State Law
Questions: Upheaval Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1371 (1995); Roger J. Miner, Federal
Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (1987). See also
William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis.
L. REv. 1, 6 (describing the views of federal judges); William W. Schwarzer & Russell R.
Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STET-
SON L. Rev. 651, 652 n.3 (1994).
This position has also been embraced in some fashion by every scholar who has ad-
dressed the matter. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of
Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 789 (1996); Abraham Abramovsky, Interstate Domestic Violence
and Murder: Are They the Same?, N.Y.L. J., July 12, 1996, at 3; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many
and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federaliza-
tion of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995); Stephen Chippendale, More
Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REv. 455 (1994);
Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. More, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime:
Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 ANNALS AmA. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 103 (1996);
Sanford Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247 (1995);
William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719 (1995);
Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the
Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503 (1995);
John B. Oakley, The Myth of Cost-Free Jurisdictional Reallocation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 52, 59 (1996); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled
Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 54 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 15 (1996).
Professor Little has argued that, as it is typically presented, the overfederalization thesis rests
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panded so greatly, the legal elites maintain, that it offends both constitu-
tional federalism and prudence. Federal judges and academics are
particularly hostile to recent efforts to vest the national government with
concurrent jurisdiction over violent street crime, which has always fit
within garden variety state offenses.2 In reasoning and result, the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez3 lends these prevail-
ing and virtually unchallenged perceptions the currency of constitutional
law. Emboldened by Lopez and the judicial and academic consensus it
reflects, some lower courts have begun invalidating recently enacted fed-
eral offenses.4
on a number of unsupported myths. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1995). But in the end he effectively embraces the thesis, endorsing a
strong presumption against concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 1070-1081.
The only published dissent from the overfederalization thesis has come from two federal
prosecutors. See generally Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model
for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. Po. & Soc. Scl. 72 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly, supra note 1, at 6 ("Most federal judges
have serious concerns about the numbers and types of crimes now being funneled into the
federal courts. They question the appropriateness of handling 'street crimes' formerly handled
in the state systems."); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 652 n.3 ("ITihe Federal Judicial
Center's 1992 survey of federal judges show[ed] that 91.5% of the active district judges and
89% of the current active circuit judges expressed strong or moderate support for 'narrowing
of federal criminal jurisdiction to reduce prosecution of "ordinary" street crime in federal
court."'); Brickey, supra note I, at 1167-72; Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 105 ("In our
view, these principles [of federalism] continue to counsel a sharply limited role for the federal
government in responding to street crime."); Kadish, supra note 1, at 1249; Oakley, supra note
1, at 59.
3 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
4 United States. v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996), (federal arson statute), modi-
fied, 90 F.3d 444 (1 lth Cir. 1996); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir.
1995) (same statute); United States v. Woodruff, No. CR-93-0438, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12358 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1996) (Hobbs Act); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F.Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C.
1996) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp.
584, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (invalidating application of federal murder-for-hire statute);
United States v. Mallory, 884 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (carjacking); United States v.
Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act),
rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Parker, 911 F.Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(Child Support Recovery Act), rev'd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4033 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (same statute); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), reconsideration denied, 912 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(same statute), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996). Many lower courts, particularly federal
appellate courts, have rejected Lopez based constitutional challenges to federal criminal stat-
utes. Many of these decisions, however, have prompted vigorous dissents. See United States
v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting) (carjacking); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., No. 95-1358, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10766 (W.D. Va.,
July 26, 1996) (civil cause of action under Violence against Women Act); United States v.
Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1454 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal gambling
statute is unconstitutional); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Batchelder, J., dissenting) (arguing that carjacking statute is unconstitutional); United States
v. Beuckelaeve, 91 F.3d 781, 787 (6th Cir. 1996) (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (possession of
machine guns); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 689 (7th Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., dissent-
1997] CRIME 249
In light of its sharp divergence from public opinion, conventional
legal wisdom should have, but so far has not, aroused skepticism and
puzzlement. Unlike constitutional civil liberties, principles of federalism
do not protect unpopular minorities by constraining the general public.
Instead, they empower the general public - sometimes on the state level
and sometimes on the national level.5 Yet this general public clearly
supports a strong national crime fighting role. According to the opinion
polls, 6 the proclamations of political leaders,7 and legislative enact-
ments,8 the public overwhelmingly views crime - especially violent
street crime - as a top-priority problem and wants the national govern-
ment engaged in efforts to stop it. On its face, at least, this view seems
quite sensible. According to a recently published study that is the most
comprehensive of its kind, crime costs the nation approximately $500
billion per year.9 It seems only logical, then, to conclude that crime con-
stitutes a very serious national problem and that the addition of national
legal, investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, and prison resources can help
address it.
This article contends that judicial and academic complaints about
the overfederalization of crime largely have matters backwards. The im-
ing) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 795-798
(5th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting) (statute addressing possession of machine guns).
5 See Tom Stacy, Whose Interests Does Federalism Protect?,__ U. Kan. L. Rev. -
(1997) (forthcoming); infra notes 129-31, 253-59, and accompanying text. See also James F.
Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1251, 1260 (1994) ("[Ihe rights conferred through federalism are typically
group-based .... [Wlithin the decentralized unit, the commitment to majoritarianism remains
intact.").
6 Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY LJ. 1, 2 n.2 (1996) (citing opinion polls for the proposition
that "crime ranks as the most serious issue facing Americans"). See also Brickey, supra note
1, at 1135 ("In January 1994 more than forty percent of Americans surveyed identified crime
as the nation's most pressing problem.").
7 Lawrence Friedman observes that President Bush, in his 1992 State of the Union ad-
dress, "declared in ringing terms that 'we must do something about crime,' especially 'violent
street crime."' LAWRENCE M. FRIEmAN, CRIME AND PUaSHMErr IN ANMERcAN HISTORY
276 (1993). Friedman traces presidential proclamations about the need to fight crime back to
President Hoover, who highlighted crime in his 1929 inaugural address and created the Wick-
ersham Commission to study it. Id. at 273. According to Friedman, "[crime popped out again
as a major national issue after World War II, and nobody was able to put the jinni back in the
bottle after that." Id. at 274.
8 See infra notes 11-17, 19-20, and accompanying text.
9 TED R. MILLER Er AL., VicTiM CosTs AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEw LooK (1996)
(report presented to the National Institute of Justice, the research and development agency of
the United States Department of Justice). Although the report estimates that the annual cost of
crime in the United States is at least $450 billion, "[t]he study excludes the cost of running the
nation's prisons, jails and parole and probation systems, which would add $40 billion, bringing
the total annual cost of crime to almost $500 billion, according to other Justice Department
statistics." Fox Butterfield, Survey Finds That Crimes Cost $450 Billion a Year, N.Y. TIvEs,
Apr. 22, 1996, at A8.
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age of a runaway national government increasingly taking away the en-
forcement of the criminal law from the States is essentially false. The
available evidence indicates that the national government's share in the
enforcement of criminal law has been actually diminishing for more than
the last half century. The national government does have concurrent au-
thority over a greater range of criminal activity now, including much
violent street crime. But, contrary to Lopez and the conventional wisdom
it embraces, this expanded authority does not transgress constitutional
principles of federalism. In fact, constitutional and policy considerations
affirmatively support the opposite conclusion that the national govern-
ment may (and probably should) exercise more authority, especially with
respect to the street crime that plagues poor urban areas. It seems that
crime, especially street crime, has been underfederalized.
Part I challenges the impression that the nation's role in enforcing
criminal law is growing. While the number of federal offenses has
grown, the national government's role in actually enforcing criminal law
reveals a fairly steady decline since the 1930s. Given the increasing in-
terdependence of the nation's economy in that same period, this decline
strongly suggests that the criminal enforcement system has been
underfederalized.
In Parts II and III, we examine what constitutional federalism has to
say about the national government's role in combating crime. We argue
that, contrary to the holding of Lopez and the broad reading some lower
courts have given it,' o the Constitution should not be read to invalidate
the recent federal legislation which expands the national government's
authority over gang-related violence,1' violence in the schools, 12 domes-
tic violence, 13 carjackings, 14 racially motivated church-burnings, 15 will-
ful failure to pay child support, 16 and the treatment of convicted sex
offenders after their release from prison.' 7 On the contrary, the values
standing behind constitutional federalism would support an even greater
10 See generally supra note 4 (listing cases in which courts have given Lopez a broad
reading).
11 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1995). See infra Part III.D.1.
12 The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990). See infra Part
III.D.l.
13 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (1994). See infra Part
III.D.3.
14 The Anti-Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994). See infra Part flI.D.1.
15 The Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392
(1996). See infra Part III.D.3.
16 The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992). See infra Part
III.D.4.
17 Megan's Law, which was signed into law in the spring of 1996, requires that states, as
a condition of receiving federal funds, implement a system of notifying communities that a
convicted sex offender intends to locate there after his release from prison. Pub. L. No. 104-
145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). See infra Part III.D.2.
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national role in crime fighting. This is particularly true respecting street
crime in poor urban areas, which judges and scholars disdain as beyond
the national government's proper province.
Part IV considers the principal policy argument pressed by those
who subscribe to the overfederalization position. This argument, which
addresses the burdens criminal cases impose on federal courts, rests on a
use of statistics so selective that it borders on the disingenuous. In fact,
the burden on federal judges is now considerably less than in prior de-
cades and, in any event, state judges face far greater burdens. Policy
considerations and constitutional values alike suggest that the criminal
law has been underfederalized.
I. THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S DIMINISHING SHARE
The overfederalization thesis trades upon an image of a national
government whose role in the enforcement of criminal law has grown
and is growing dramatically. Writing on behalf of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Round table on the Federalization of Crime, for instance, Duke
Law Professor Sara Sun Beale has recently proclaimed: "By virtually
every measure, the federal government is playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in the enforcement of criminal law."18 The image of a con-
stantly growing national role has been created and maintained by
ritualistic incantation of a few selected statistics. Devotees of the
overfederalization position commonly observe (often with a note of exas-
peration) that there are now over 3,000 federal criminal offenses 19 and
that Congress has created new offenses at an accelerating pace. 20 They
also never fail to mention that the number of federal criminal cases filed
As Megan's law indicates, Congress has not limited its expanding involvement to the
enactment of additional federal offenses. Congress also has used its spending power to induce
states to change their sentencing practices for state law crimes. For example, the 1994 Crime
Bill conditioned grants for construction of state prisons on a state's enacting "truth in sentenc-
ing" laws that require convicted defendants to serve at least 85% of their sentences. The
grants are also conditioned on a state's sentencing a higher percentage of violent offenders to
prison and increasing the average prison term for violent offenders. Brickey, supra note 1, at
1173 n.200.
18 Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When
Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (1995). See also
Ashdown, supra note 1, at 793, 802.
19 See, e.g., Ashdown, supra note 1, at 802; Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause
and Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 21,
28 (1996); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 681 (1992).
20 See, e.g., Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly, supra note 1, at 7 ("[H]ardly a congres-
sional session goes by without an attempt to add new sections to the federal criminal code.").
See also Beale, supra note 1, at 979; Brickey, supra note 1, at 1145; Marshall, supra note 1, at
722-23. For the history of the expanding number of federal offenses, see infra note 100. For a
listing of recently created federal criminal offenses, see Beale, supra note 1, at 979-80; John C.
Jeffries & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal
1997]
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has increased by more than 70 percent since 1980.21 These facts cohere
with and reinforce the common perception that, since the New Deal era,
the national government has played a greatly expanded role in all facets
of American life. The notion of a greatly expanded and expanding na-
tional role in the enforcement of criminal law thus seems quite plausible.
Indeed, no one has seriously questioned it.22
This depiction of the national government's role, however, is not
just misleading; it is essentially false. True, Congress has given the na-
tional government concurrent authority over an increasingly wide range
of criminal activity, including much street crime.23 But a considerable
body of statistical evidence reveals that the national government's exer-
cise of its concurrent authority has been so selective that its share of
overall enforcement has actually declined for more than the last half cen-
tury. The actual pattern of national crime fighting efforts, then, raises the
real possibility that crime has been underfederalized.
A. CASE FILINGS
The number of criminal cases that are filed per year furnishes one
rough measure of the comparative shares of the national and state gov-
ernments' efforts in combating crime. Case filings, while far from a per-
fect indicator, do provide a useful gauge of the level of investigative,
Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1097 (1995); Marshall, supra note 1, at 746-54 (Appen-
dix B) (listing new federal offenses created by the 1994 Crime Bill).
21 See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 1, at 36 (noting a "more than 50%"
increase between 1980 and 1989); Wallace letter, supra note I (noting a nearly 60% increase
between 1981 and 1991); Ashdown, supra note 1, at 803; Beale, supra note 1, at 984; Cowen,
supra note 1, at 1375; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1250; Mengler, supra note 1, at 505.
22 In discussing the history of the national criminal justice system, proponents of the
overfederalization thesis concentrate almost entirely on the offenses over which the national
government has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 775-79 (1983); Brickey, supra note 1, at 1137-45. See
also infra note 100. They routinely discuss the burden that federal criminal filings, particu-
larly drug prosecutions, impose on the federal courts. See infra Part IV.A. They also occa-
sionally mention that state courts face even greater burdens. Other than these statements,
however, the proponents have paid scant attention to the degree to which the national govern-
ment actually has used its expanding concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
Only Professors Zirning and Hawkins have even attempted to gauge the overall state and
national roles in the actual exercise of crime fighting authority. Zimring & Hawkins, supra
note 1, at 16-17. Reciting 1986 statistics concerning the percentage of prisoners, jail inmates,
and police officers accounted for by the national and state systems, they report that "the na-
tional government is still a less than 10 percent partner in the administration of criminal jus-
tice." Id. at 16. Zimring and Hawkins, however, did not look at the evidence concerning
changes in the overall federal and state roles over time. They nonetheless make the unsup-
ported (and, it turns out, erroneous) assertion that "the role of the federal government has
expanded since the New Deal . i..." Id
23 In addition to the recently enacted federal crimes mentioned in the text accompanying
notes 11-17, the national government now has concurrent jurisdiction over, inter alia, auto-
theft, bank robbery, and drug crimes.
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prosecutorial, and judicial resources that government expends in address-
ing crime.
Although judges and scholars have relied on recent increases in fed-
eral filings as evidence of overfederalization, their use of statistics has
been misleading.24 In 1980, which judges and scholars use as the base
year for measuring the recent increase, the number of federal criminal
filings was at an historic low, lower than in any year since 1917.2 Be-
yond this, a recent increase in federal filings does not and cannot, by
itself, establish an expanding national share. To gauge changes in na-
tional and state crime fighting shares, one must try to compare federal
filings with state filings and compare trends over a longer period of time.
The data that permit a direct comparison of federal and state crimi-
nal case filings, although available only for 1984 and subsequent years,26
show a striking decline in the national share. While federal felony filings
increased by about 32% from 1984-94, felony filings in state courts in-
creased by 64% for that period.27 The share of the felony caseload borne
by the federal courts declined from 2.15% to 1.78%.28 The trend is
24 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25 Unless otherwise indicated, figures concerning federal filings are drawn from the fol-
lowing sources: For the years since 1940, the annual report published by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; for the years 1934-39, the Annual Report of the Attorney
General; and for the years before 1933, Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal
Prosecutions, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. tNOBs. 494, 497 (1934).
26 Since 1975, the National Center for State Courts has been engaged in an institutional
effort to collect and publish caseload information for all state courts. Its published data regard-
ing overall state criminal filings from 1975-81, however, are incomplete, and the Center itself
regards these data as unreliable. No published data are available for 1982-83. Since 1984, the
NCSC has reported filings information for the courts of general jurisdiction of forty two states
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Unless otherwise indicated, the state statistics discussed in this section are drawn from the
Center's reports and databases for the years 1984-94, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, NATIONAL STATE COURT
CASELOAD TRENDS, 1984-1994 (1996), and from its electronic database on felony filings in
state courts [hereinafter 1984-94 DATABASE]. See Attachment to E-mail Message from Neil
LaPointe to Kim Dayton, Aug. 8, 1996 (containing database) (on file with the authors).
Any references to state court filings thus understate the total filings in state courts be-
cause, following the Center's data, they exclude nine States and refer only to state courts of
general jurisdiction.
27 In 1984, some 23,000 felony cases were filed in the federal district courts, compared
with 1.06 million in state courts. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF Tm UNrrED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1991. In 1994, the number of federal felony filings had
increased to just under 31,000 cases, while felony filings in the States had increased to over
1.7 million. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR 1994.
28 At least in recent years, felony filings have composed a slightly higher percentage of
all filings in federal courts than in state courts. In 1994, for example, felony filings composed
67% of federal criminal case filings, compared to 59% in state courts of general jurisdiction.
Instead of comparing felony filings, one can compare all criminal filings. In terms of raw
numbers, there were in 1984 about 37,000 criminal case filings in federal courts; in the state
courts of general jurisdiction for which figures are available, some 10 million. By 1994, the
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slightly more pronounced if one compares the rates of growth in filings
rather than the absolute numbers of filings. According to a comparative
study by National Center for State Courts, the growth rate in felony fil-
ings in state courts was 70% - more than twice the growth rate in fed-
eral felony filings (33%).29 In the ten years since 1984, which
encompass much of the time period on which judges and academics rely
to establish overfederalization, 30 the data on criminal filings unequivo-
cally show a declining national share.
In fact, by excluding juvenile filings, these data understate how
much the national share has decreased. Juvenile crime rates, arrests, and
filings - particularly respecting violent crimes - are significantly on
the rise. Data compiled by the National Center for State Courts show
that, between 1984 and 1994, juvenile adjudications in the state courts
increased from 1.2 to 1.9 million (59%).31 Both the impact and burden
of this dramatic rise in the juvenile crime rate falls almost exclusively on
the state courts. 32
total number of federal criminal filings stood at about 45,500 cases, while the total number of
state criminal filings had risen to nearly 13.5 million. These raw numbers reflect, respectively,
a 27% increase in total federal criminal filings and a 35% increase in state criminal filings.
The growth rate in total criminal filings in state courts was 36% from 1984-94, compared to a
growth rate of 28% in the federal courts.
In terms of the overall number of criminal prosecutions initiated in the United States, the
national share is minimal: between 1984 and 1994, the national component of all criminal
prosecutions represented an average of only .35% of all criminal filings (felonies and misde-
meanors), declining from .36% of all cases in 1984 to .34% in 1994. The states' share of total
criminal prosecutions, of course, increased concomitantly over that same period - a percent-
age increase that translates to more than 3.5 million more criminal cases prosecuted in state
courts in 1994 than in 1984.
29 BRIAN J. OsTRAM & NEAL B. KAUDER, ANNUAL REPORT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 1994 22 (National Center for State Courts, 1996).
30 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31 OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 29, at 46. According to the National Criminal Justice
Reference Service, while the rate of juvenile crime remained fairly constant between 1973 and
1988, between 1988 and 1992 the arrest rate for juvenile violent crime increased more than
fifty percent. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT (1995). See also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS. COMBATING VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY: THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE AC-
TION PLAN 19 (1996) [hereinafter COMBATING VIOLENCE] ("Between 1983 and 1992, juvenile
arrest rates for Violent Crime Index offenses increased nearly 60 percent, while adult rates
increased by 47 percent.").
32 We have been unable to locate statistics that would reveal whether the federal share of
juvenile prosecutions has been increasing or decreasing. For purposes of the point made in the
text, however, it does not matter, because whether increasing or decreasing, the national share
of juvenile prosecutions is far lower than the national share of adult prosecutions. "Federal
prosecutions of juveniles, whether as delinquents or as criminal offenders, account for less
than 1 percent of all Federal prosecutions." COMBATING VIOLENCE, supra note 31, at 26
(emphasis added). See also John Ashcroft, Clinton Lets Juveniles Guilty of Federal Gun
Crimes Off the Hook, Congressional Press Release (Fed. Doc. Cir. H. July 8, 1996) ("[S]ince
taking office, the Clinton Administration has prosecuted only 233 juveniles for federal crime,
that is fewer than two prosecutions per state in a three year period."). As juvenile prosecutions
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Although one cannot directly compare the federal and state filings
for the years before 1984, other measures indicate that the 1984-94 trend
is not an aberration, but a part of a larger historical pattern. One such
measure is federal criminal filings relative to population. Although there
have been considerable variations in the average number of criminal fil-
ings for each decade since the turn of the century, a linear trend line for
these averages (see chart above) shows only a minimal increase in the
average between the 1940s and 1983.
Meanwhile, the nation's population increased dramatically. Be-
tween 1900 and 1995, for instance, the population of the United States
increased by nearly 350%: about 76 million to more than 263 million.33
Over that same period, however, the total number of federal criminal
prosecutions (felony and misdemeanor) rose from about 17,000 cases to
comprise a larger proportion of criminal prosecutions, then, the national share of all criminal
prosecutions shrinks.
33 U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, BuREAu OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 1995 6 (1995).
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somewhat less than 46,000 - less than 275%. 34 From 1940 to 1980, the
population increased by 79%35 while federal criminal filings increased
by only 15%.36 As depicted in the chart above, the annual number of
federal criminal prosecutions has not kept pace with the rate of general
population increases, as one might have expected it would. In per capita
terms, the national government's crime fighting role has declined quite
significantly since the turn of the century.
Available data from individual states37 tend to confirm the expecta-
tion that state criminal prosecutions have kept better pace with popula-
tion increases, indicating that the national share has declined. In Kansas,
for example, there were a total of 3,494 criminal dispositions in the dis-
trict courts in 1927 (both felonies and misdemeanors); in 1984, there
were 24,623 in 1984: an increase of more than 600%.38 Federal crimi-
nal filings, in contrast, declined by more than 44% between 1927 and
34 See supra note 25.
35 U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, supra note 33, at 6.
36 See supra note 25.
37 Sources of information concerning state criminal caseloads prior to 1984 are less ex-
tensive than federal criminal justice statistics, and there is no compilation that totals the data
available for individual States. Nonetheless, some historical data are available for the courts
systems of some States.
38 See KANSAS SUPREME COURT, OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COURTS OF KANSAS, 1983-84 FIscAL YEAR 1 (1984) (reporting 1984 criminal disposi-
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1984.39 From 1938 to 1984, felony case dispositions in New York's
Supreme and County Courts rose over 300%;4 0 criminal dispositions in
the federal courts, on the other hand, rose a mere 11.5%. In Texas, crim-
inal filings in the state district courts rose from 19,933 cases in 1950 to
108,796 cases in 198441 - an increase of more than 500%. During that
same 1950 to 1984 time period, federal criminal filings increased by only
6%.42
More recent data likewise indicate that the growth in state criminal
filings has consistently outstripped the growth of federal criminal fil-
ings. 43 In North Carolina, for example, total criminal filings increased
from 39,138 cases in 1971 to 68,067 in 1984: an increase of nearly 74%
in just thirteen years.44 In the federal courts, by comparison, criminal
filings declined 11%. 4 5 From 1975 to 1984, the total number of reported
criminal filings in the Michigan Circuit Courts rose from 27,576 to
41,990 cases (+52%), while reported criminal filings in Tennessee were
up almost 36%. Federal filings over that ten-year period declined
12.5%.46
Even if we assume some inconsistency and error in the data collec-
tion methods the state courts used before 1984 and even if we recognize
tions statistics); REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF KANSAS 153 (1927) (reporting 1927
criminal dispositions statistics).
39 See supra note 25, 1985 REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 170 (table 38: 35,911 criminal filings in 1984, excluding transfers); Rubin,
supra note 25, at 497 (64,614 criminal filings). If Prohibition cases are excluded from the
1927 federal filings, federal filings increased, but only by 50%.
40 See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT No. 23 (1939) (tables 24,25: reporting 1938 criminal caseload statis-
tics for Supreme and County Courts); SIXTH AND SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 13 (1984) (reporting 1984 criminal caseload statistics for
Supreme and County Courts).
41 COURT STATISTICS PRoJECT STAFF, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 1984 83 (National Center for State Courts 1984) (criminal filings in
district courts); TwENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO
THE GOVERNOR AND SUPREME COURT 50 (1951) (reporting 1950 district court criminal case
filings statistics).
42 1951 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 101 (36,322 filings); 1985 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES 170.
43 Except as noted, the state court criminal filings figures discussed in this paragraph are
derived from data reported in, respectively, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1975 42 (197) (table 23) [hereinafter STATE
COURT ANN. STATS. 1975]; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS, 1994 158-62 (1995) (table 10) [hereinafter STATE COURT ANN. STATS. 1994].
44 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1988 83 (1986) (table 11); North Carolina Superior Court Statistics 1971-95
<www:http:llwww.tomhiisd.aoc.state.nc.uslfutures2.htm> (1971 filings).
45 See supra text accompanying note 25; 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFCE OF THE UNITED STATES 250 (1975) (41,291 filings).
46 Id. (41,108 filings).
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that there are wide variations in the rates of per-capita criminal filings
among the states, these state criminal filings statistics indicate that the
federal share of law enforcement activities has been shrinking for at least
the last half century. A direct comparison of federal and state filings
shows that the national share fell between 1984 and 1994. Prior to 1984,
federal filings, when compared with both population trends and filings
for individual States, also indicate a declining national share.
B. PRISONERS
The numbers of inmates in state and federal prisons furnish yet an-
other measure of the state and national crime fighting shares. Like the
measure of case filings, these numbers indicate that the national share
has declined over the last half century, not expanded.47
Near the beginning of this century, the federal prison population
constituted only about 2.8% of the total population of prisoners in the
United States. The percentage of the nation's prisoners under federal
jurisdiction swelled during the Prohibition era (the 1920s and early
1930s) and never fell back to pre-Prohibition levels. In 1940, well after
Prohibition and before the United State's entrance into World War II, the
federal share of the prison population stood at 11.6%.48 But since that
time the percentage of prisoners in federal institutions has declined each
decade. In the 1940s, an average of 11.7% of the nation's prisoners were
housed in federal prisons. In the 1950s and 1960s, the average remained
relatively constant at the lower levels of 10.6% and 10.3%, respectively.
The decade's average percentage fell somewhat in the 1970s to 9.9% and
then quite precipitously to 6.6% in the 1980s. By the 1980s, then, the
percentage of the nation's prisoners in federal rather than state prison had
fallen to nearly half of its 1940s level.
Since 1990, the national share of the prison population has in-
creased from 6.4% in 1990 to 7.8% in 1994. 49 Yet, as the diminishing
national share of criminal filings indicates, this increase almost surely
47 Our discussion of statistics regarding federal and state prison populations is derived
from a number of sources, including: U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 (1996) [hereinafter
HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS]; U.S. DEFT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTI-
CAL ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1995); and materials compiled by the National Center for State Courts. These pris-
oner statistics do not include individuals housed in local jails, which comprise about one-third
of all state incarcerations. See generally, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, NATION'S JAILS HOLD REC-
ORD 442, 490; Inmates (Press Release, Apr. 30, 1995) <www:http.//www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/
jails.txt.>.
48 The federal share of prisoners reached its zenith in 1945, when 12.7% of the nation's
prisoner population was housed in federal penal institutions. See HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS
STATISTICS, supra note 47, at 29 (percentages derived from table 3-2).
49 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994 (Aug. 1995).
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reflects the harsher sentences of the federal sentencing guidelines. 50 Fur-
ther, even with the increase of this decade, the national share of the
prison population is presently lower than it was in any decade since the
1920s, with the exception of the 1980s, when the national share was at its
lowest since before Prohibition.5'
50 Id. at 12 (linking changes in federal prison populations to the sentencing guidelines,
which increased the average length of sentences and increased the number of offenders who
receive a sentence of incarceration rather than probation).
51 Critics of the federal government's current crime fighting role sometimes mention a
fourth measure of the respective roles of the federal and state governments: expenditures
required to support their respective criminal justice systems. Critics frequently cite figures
showing recent dramatic increases in total federal expenditures as evidence of overfederaliza-
tion. Professor Beale, for example, noted in 1995 that "in actual dollars, federal expenditures
increased from 1971-1990 by 668 percent, more than the combined increase of 597 percent for
1997]
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C. IMPLICATIONS
The various statistical measures discussed above undermine a cen-
tral empirical premise of the overfederalization position. The statistics
furnish no support whatsoever for the claim that the national govern-
ment's crime fighting role has grown, much less that the growth has been
rapid and unrestrained. Taken together, these measures in fact compel-
lingly demonstrate the opposite conclusion that the national govern-
ment's crime fighting share has been declining for over sixty years.
This decline strongly suggests that crime has been underfederalized,
not overfederalized. Two paths lead to this conclusion. First, an analogy
can be drawn between civil and criminal regulation. Especially since the
New Deal in the 1930s, the national government has played an increas-
ingly important role in the civil regulation of the nation's businesses. It
is generally thought that, with the increasing integration of the United
States economy, resulting from developments in transportation, commu-
nications, and production, an expanded regulatory national role is appro-
priate.52 An expanded national role would also seem appropriate for the
enforcement of criminal laws, especially given crime's high costs to the
national economy 53 and the high priority the public attaches to the
problem. 54
all state and local governments." Beale, supra note 18, at 1292, 1295 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT 1990 4
(1992).
To the extent that expenditure data are relevant measures of the respective roles of the
federal, state, and local governments, the picture they paint is considerably more complex than
these commentators would appear to recognize. Most important is the fact that the lion's share
of the "1971-90" increase in expenditures started to occur in 1987, during the period when the
national share of federal criminal filings declined. The past decade's dramatic increase in
federal criminal justice expenditures is considerably disproportionate to the total number of
criminal and felony criminal filings in each year of that same period, which actually decreased
slightly over the 1971-92 time frame. Interestingly, the increase in federal expenditures since
1987 coincides with the new federal sentencing regime ushered in by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which carry demanding procedural costs and higher sentences.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995) (modern doctrine that
expands Congress's commerce powers recognizes "the great changes that had occurred in the
way business was carried on in this country"); id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing
against "reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century
economy, dependent upon production and trading practices that had changed but little over the
preceding centuries"); id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A] holding that the particular stat-
ute before us falls within the commerce power would not expand the scope of that Clause.
Rather, it simply would apply preexisting law to changing economic circumstances."); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) ("[T]he powers conferred upon the Federal
Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the ex-
pansion of the Federal Government's role" to activities that would have been "unimaginable to
the Framers.").
53 See generally supra note 9; infra notes 89-90, 178-79, and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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Second, the ever increasing sophistication and integration of the
United States economy since the 1930s has strengthened the justifica-
tions for national crime fighting. More criminal activity crosses state
boundaries now.5 5 Specialized law enforcement technologies and exper-
tise have a wider application.56 One State's enforcement efforts have a
greater impact in other States. 57 The redistributive rationale for national
authority carries greater weight because business and capital are more
mobile.58
Both the civil analogy and the justifications for national crime fight-
ing thus suggest that an expanded national share would be permissible as
a matter of constitutional law and desirable as a matter of social policy.
That the national government's share actually has declined tends to indi-
cate an underfederalization of crime. The following sections subject this
hypothesis to critical scrutiny as a matter of law and policy.
II. THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND TRADITION
According to conventional legal wisdom, the national government's
current role in crime fighting violates constitutional principles of federal-
ism. Part I partly defused this criticism by showing that the national
share of law enforcement actually diminished over the last sixty years.
This demonstration, however, still does not quell the objection that Con-
gress has given the national government concurrent jurisdiction over too
many kinds of offenses. Prompted partly by constitutional concerns, pro-
ponents of the overfederalization thesis would like to sharply curtail the
scope of the national government's criminal jurisdiction, especially over
street crime.59
55 See infra Part Im.B.2.
56 Id.
57 See infra Part ILI.B.4.a.
58 See infra Part nI.B.4.b.
59 At the heart of the overfederalization thesis is the contention that the national govern-
ment now has jurisdiction over too much crime, especially street crime. Litman & Greenberg,
supra note 1, at 73-74. Judges and scholars have offered different standards for defining the
parameters of national criminal jurisdiction. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1631-32, 1631 n.3 (1995) (identifying factors such as whether the proscribed activity is com-
mercial in nature; whether the statute requires a jurisdictional nexus between the particular
case and interstate commerce; whether Congress made findings concerning the impact of the
proscribed activity on interstate commerce; and whether the activity lies within a traditional
domain of state regulation); LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24-25 (listing five types of
offenses over which the national government properly has jurisdiction); Little, supra note 1, at
1077-81 (advocating a demonstrated state failure principle); Mengler, supra note 1, at 526
(listing four of the same categories); Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 22-24 (listing four
justifications for national involvement). But the Judges and scholars agree that the national
government should not have jurisdiction over ordinary street crime, such as small scale gun
and drug offenses, gang violence, carjacking, and domestic violence. See, e.g., Ashdown,
supra note 1, at 801; Brickey, supra note 1, at 1148, 1159-65, 1167-68; Kadish, supra note 1,
at 1251; Mengler, supra note 1, at 527; Mordecai Rosenfeld, The Law and the Yucca Yucca
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Lopez dramatically enlarges the importance of the constitutional
doubts over the existing scope of national criminal jurisdiction.60 Before
Lopez, any such doubts could be dismissed as academic; apparently set-
tled constitutional doctrine gave Congress virtually unlimited regulatory
power in relation to the states.61 Yet in striking down the federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act,62 Lopez invigorates and endorses constitutional
Plant, N.Y.L. J. 2 (June 16, 1989) (reporting Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement that "garden
variety crimes d[o] not belong in federal court"); Zirning & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 24-25.
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
60 Until Lopez, judicial and scholarly critics of the federalization of crime addressed their
arguments exclusively to Congress. See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 1, at 1170-71 (noting that
"the courts' liberal approach to commerce clause jurisdiction... gives the government 'carte
blanche for federal invasion of the traditional realm of the states."'). Yet in explaining the
increased national involvement in terms of the political incentives facing national politicians,
see Ashdown, supra note 1, at 795, 806-07; Marshall, supra note 1, at 723-24, their logic
ineluctably suggested that Congress would be unreceptive and their arguments for limiting
national authority entirely futile. Lopez and the Court's "new federalism" decisions, however,
raise the strong possibility that the overfederalization thesis may succeed in the Supreme Court
even as it fails in Congress.
61 Prior to Lopez, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), was the leading decision
concerning Congress's authority to create federal crimes. At issue in Perez was a federal
statute that made loansharking a crime. Although the statute did not require a case-by-case
showing that the particular loansharking transaction had any effect on interstate commerce, the
Court held that Congress had validly enacted the statute pursuant to its powers under the
Commerce Clause.
The Court's holding was based on an application of the doctrinal rules that then had been
controlling since the demise of the Lochner Court in the 1930s. Under those rules, Congress
has authority to regulate any class of intrastate activity it rationally believes might exert a
substantial and harmful effect on interstate commerce if left unregulated. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-9, at 162 (5th ed. 1995). Citing congressional findings, the
Perez Court reasoned that Congress had rationally concluded that the class of intrastate loan-
sharking activities, taken as a whole, had a substantial and adverse effect on interstate com-
merce. 402 U.S. at 155-57.
In light of the interdependence of the modem United States economy, the same can be
said about any class of criminal activity Congress might choose to regulate. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra § 4-10(c), at 167 (under modem doctrine, "[clongress could make almost any
local activity a federal crime"). See also infra notes 9, 89-94, 178-79, and accompanying text.
As Perez illustrates and as scholars have unanimously observed, modem pre-Lopez Com-
merce Clause doctrine accorded Congress essentially all encompassing regulatory authority,
including carte blanche to expand the national government's role in the enforcement of crimi-
nal law. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-8, at 316 (2d ed.
1988) ("Contemporary commerce clause doctrine grants Congress such broad power that judi-
cial review of the affirmative authorization for congressional action is largely a formality.");
Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. Rnv. 554, 554 (1995) ("[W]e have a collection of doctri-
nal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow Congress to do anything it wants under the
commerce power."); Deborah J. Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for
the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1565 (1994). Judges and scholars writing before Lopez
were thus quick to concede the constitutionality of national crime control efforts as a matter of
positive law. Kadish, supra note 1, at 1248; Mengler, supra note 1, at 507.
62 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990).
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worries about the national government's concurrent jurisdiction over
crime. A lively debate is now brewing in the law journals and lower
courts over how broadly the Court will and should read Lopez.63 By
contributing to this ongoing debate, an assessment of the overfederaliza-
tion thesis's constitutional claims can now have doctrinal as well as aca-
demic significance.
In the next two Parts, we argue that the constitutional objections to
the current national crime fighting role are quite misplaced. This Part
begins with the threshold question of the source(s) from which the Con-
stitution's meaning can be discerned. We maintain that the Justices in
Lopez, as well as other proponents of the overfederalization thesis, are
wrong to think that they can glean the national government's constitu-
tional role from Constitutional text or societal tradition. The text em-
braces principles that the modem world has now brought into conflict
and the uses of tradition are inherently unprincipled and illegitimate.
A. TEXT AND HISTORY
In modem times, the Constitution's text does not prescribe the per-
missible scope of the national government's role in fighting crime. The
text embraces two fundamental principles. Article I and the Tenth
63 See Part III. D. (discussing the proper outcome of the split of authority over the consti-
tutionality of numerous recently enacted offenses).
The Lopez Court sent conflicting signals concerning the intended breadth of its decision.
In striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, aspects of the Court's opinion stress case-
specific features suggesting that the decision has a very limited import. See Deborah J. Mer-
ritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674 (1995). The Court emphasized that Congress had
made no findings specifically addressing the impact of the regulated activity on the national
economy, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32, 1632 n.4.; the Act contained no jurisdictional element that
required the prosecution to establish a nexus between each case and interstate commerce, 115
S. Ct. at 1631; the possession of guns has a "noncommercial" nature, 115 S. Ct. 1630-31,
1633; and the Act involved both education and the criminal law, each of which traditionally
has been the subject of state law, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3, 1632-33. See also 115 S. Ct. 1634,
1640, 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Other aspects of the Justices' opinions, however, point toward a broad import. The Court
stressed that the Constitution envisions limits on the regulatory powers of the national govern-
ment, 115 S. Ct. at 1626, 1628-29, 1632, 1634, and that criminal law, by tradition, has been
left to the States, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3, 1632. This emphasis and the Court's reliance on
tradition in a number of other constitutional contexts suggest that the Court might define the
principle of limited national power in light of tradition. If this is what Lopez signals, the
decision could have dramatic consequences. Given the role of federal criminal law at the time
of the founding and for nearly one hundred years thereafter, see infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text, federal criminal jurisdiction might be limited in the name of tradition to activity
that either involves the federal government itself or deprives freed slaves and their sympathiz-
ers of their civil rights. Alternatively, Lopez might be read in light of the Court's reasoning
that a decision to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act effectively would remove all limits
on national power. 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33, 1634. As many lower courts have found, this same
logic can be seen to encompass many other federal offenses of recent vintage. See supra note
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Amendment envision limits on national regulatory authority, while the
Commerce Clause contemplates congressional authority to address na-
tional economic problems. While fully compatible at this nation's
founding, these two principles now conflict. The Constitution's text and
history do not resolve this conflict, which simply did not exist in the
founders' world.
1. Express Enumeration and Implied Authority
An analysis of the text must begin with the four criminal offenses
the Constitution explicitly mentions. Article I gives Congress the power
to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas," 64 to "define and punish . . . offenses against the Law of Na-
tions," 65 and to "provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the...
current Coin of the United States."' 66 Article III itself defines the offense
of treason against the United States67 and gives Congress the power "to
declare the Punishment of Treason .... "68
In addition to according Congress express authority over these of-
fenses, the Constitution seems to give Congress implied authority to cre-
ate other criminal offenses. It accords Congress other, more general
powers, 69 such as the power to regulate interstate commerce, 70 and it also
grants Congress the overarching power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" these powers. 71 These
provisions, it seems, give Congress implied authority to enact criminal
laws as a necessary and proper means of effectuating its enumerated
powers, including the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Perhaps one could argue that, by mentioning only four criminal of-
fenses, the Constitution excludes the creation of other crimes as a neces-
sary and proper means of carrying out Congress's other enumerated
powers. As a textual matter, this argument has some plausibility. Article
I, for instance, gives Congress authority to "coin Money,"72 and one
would think that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a power to
criminalize counterfeiting would be clearly implied. But instead of leav-
ing this power to implication under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Article I accords Congress power to "provide for the Punishment of
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
65 Id.
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c. 1.
68 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
69 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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counterfeiting.., current Coin of the United States . ... ,73 That the
drafters felt a need to specify the power to criminalize counterfeiting, it
might be argued, indicates their understanding that Congress lacks the
power to create federal crimes absent express textual authority to do so.
Although this reading of the text is not unreasonable, it does not
reflect the founders' true understanding. In 1790, the First Congress en-
acted a Crimes Act which created several federal crimes not mentioned
in the Constitution, including perjury in federal court and murder on land
controlled by the federal government.74 The authority to create such
crimes, if it exists, must be implied as necessary and proper to the execu-
tion of Congress's enumerated powers, such as its powers respecting fed-
eral courts75 and federal property.76 Yet no member of the First
Congress (which included many of those who participated in the Consti-
tution's drafting and ratification) questioned Congress's authority to
criminalize perjury in federal courts or murder on federal property. 77
The Crimes Act of 1790 is thus compelling evidence that the foun-
ders did not intend the national role in criminal law to be limited to
crimes expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Commentators 78 and
Supreme Court Justices 79 accordingly have consistently and universally
recognized that Congressional authority to create criminal offenses ex-
tends beyond these expressly mentioned offenses.
2. The Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
Proponents of the overfederalization thesis therefore must (and do)
look beyond textually specified crimes for limits on national crime fight-
ing. The Lopez Court, for instance, relied upon the principle of limited
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
74 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 71.
75 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also U.S. CONsT. art. III.
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
77 See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 56 (1996) ("At the outset, the First Congress
recognized that federal criminal law authority was not limited to the few explicit constitutional
grants of authority to define punishments.").
78 According to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, expressing one thing is
excluding another. BLACK's LAW DIC-noNARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). Proponents of the
overfederalization thesis, however, do not invoke this maxim to claim that the Constitution
should be read to deny Congress all authority to enact criminal offenses not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution. They maintain only that the Constitution's text evidences an origi-
nal understinding that the national government would play an extremely limited role in the
enforcement of criminal law. Brickey, supra note 1, at 1137-38; Mengler, supra note 1, at
508; Miner, supra note 1, at 118.
79 The view that Congress has implied authority to create unspecified criminal offenses is
an implicit premise of Lopez and can be traced all the way back to United States v. Coombs, 37
U.S. 72, 76-78 (1838).
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national power, which is evident in the text and structure of Article 180
and is even more explicit in the Tenth Amendment.8 1
There is, however, a fundamental and unavoidable problem with re-
lying on the Tenth Amendment to limit national crime fighting. In the
circumstances of a fully integrated and modem national economy, im-
posing such limits denies Congress the full authority the Commerce
Clause contemplates. Simply put, the demise of the radically localized
world of the late eighteenth century and the rise of the modem national
economy has brought the principle of a limited national regulatory au-
thority into conflict with the Commerce Clause.
In view of its text and history, the Commerce Clause gives Congress
authority to address significant impediments to an effective interstate
economy by giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ..,.
among the several States .... -82 Even if one defines, as the Court has
done throughout its history, "commerce among the States" to refer to
goods as they cross state lines, Congress's authority cannot, has not, and
should not be limited to such activity. The evident purpose of the Com-
merce Clause and several other powers specified in Article I is to facili-
tate a vibrant interstate economy. 83 That purpose, coupled with the
80 The very first sentence of Article I states: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Article proceeds to enumerate certain subjects on which Congress has power to legislate.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Together with Article I's opening statement, the
enumeration of such powers can only mean that Congress's constitutional legislative authority
is not all-encompassing and instead is limited to the granted powers.
81 The Tenth Amendment declares: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
The principle of limited national power is further confirmed by the history of the Consti-
tution's drafting and ratification. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 313 (James E. Cooke
ed., 1987) (Madison) ("[The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined."). The principle has been recognized consistently by the
Supreme Court. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (collecting cases).
82 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83 This aim can be seen in the overall structure and text of Article I. Article I grants
Congress authority, inter alia, to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, create a national cur-
rency, establish post offices and roads, and grant patents and copyrights. These provisions are
best understood as overlapping powers that share with the Commerce Clause the goal of facili-
tating the maintenance and development of a robust national economy. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 41, at 269 (James E. Cook ed., 1987) (Madison) (describing all of the powers mentioned
above belonging to a category of powers designed to "provide for the harmony and proper
intercourse among States").
The aim is also evident in the genesis of the Commerce Clause. Under the Articles of
Confederation, States were free to and apparently did enact protectionist measures that inhib-
ited trade among the States. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention unanimously
agreed that this was contrary to the common interest and that Congress should have authority
to regulate interstate commerce. They evidently thought that an effective interstate economy is
in the common interest and that, due to the parochial perspective of individual States, States
cannot be relied upon to further that end. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concur-
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Necessary and Proper Clause, gives Congress authority to address intra-
state activity that hinders the flow of goods across state lines. Any lesser
degree of authority would be inadequate to fulfill this goal of a well-
functioning national economy. Indeed, the modem doctrine that has de-
veloped since the demise of the Lochner Court embraces just this under-
standing of the Commerce Clause. ,
In the modem world, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the
power to reach essentially all intrastate activity.84 In late eighteenth cen-
tury America, when the Constitution became law, "the vast majority of
colonists lived on small farms where they produced most of the food,
clothing, firewood, and other goods themselves."8 5 As Justice O'Connor
has observed, "In an era when interstate commerce represented a tiny
fraction of economic activity and most goods and services were produced
and consumed close to home, the interstate commerce power left a broad
range of activities beyond the reach of Congress." 8 6 But, as Justice
O'Connor also observed: "In the decades since ratification of the Consti-
ring) ("[W]e have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.");
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Tihe Framers of our Constitution intended Congress to have sufficient power to address
national problems."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce
Clause: A Political Theory of Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1369 (1994) ("In light of
the nation's experience under the Articles of Confederation, there was a consensus after adop-
tion of the Constitution that the federal government should be able to exercise national author-
ity to facilitate a national market."); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover
Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV.
615, 641 n.138 (1995) ("Madison thought it was clear that the encouragement of manufacture
was one of the purposes of the Commerce Clause.").
84 Under modern doctrine, Congress has authority to regulate any intrastate activity it
rationally believes might have a significant adverse effect on the interstate economy. See
supra note 61. Commentators agree that, under this doctrine, Congress essentially has all-
encompassing authority. Id. Until Lopez, which qualifies modern doctrine, every case that
faithfully followed this doctrine rejected arguments that Congress had exceeded its Commerce
Clause authority in regulating private intrastate activity. Lopez marked the first time in nearly
sixty years that the Court had invalidated federal regulation of private actors as beyond Con-
gress's commerce powers. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 61 § 4-9, at 162.
85 DANIEL E. DIAMON & JOHN. D. GUiLFOIL, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC HISTORY 145
(1973) ("Self-sufficient, family-operated farms characterized United States agriculture as late
as the early nineteenth century."); BARRY S. POULSON, EONOMIC HIsTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 69 (1981). See also HERMAN E. KRooss, AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEvELoPMErr 37
(1974) ("[Alt the end of the Colonial Period, 90 out of every 100 Americans worked on farms,
or in the forest, or as fishermen; manufacturing and construction absorbel another five; and
trade and services were practically nonexistent.").
86 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See also DIAMON & GuiLFOIL, supra note 85, at 144:
In the absence of navigable water routes, the packhorse was the dominant means of
overland transportation in the interior region of the United States in the eighteenth
century. Due to the high cost and time consuming nature of packhorse transporta-
tion, the only commodities which could be shipped were those with high value and
low perishability. The chief commodities fulfilling such requirements were fur and,
to a lesser degree, whiskey and guns.
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tution, interstate economic activity has greatly expanded. Industrializa-
tion, coupled with advances in transportation and communications, has
created a national economy in which virtually every activity occurring
within the borders of a State plays a part. ",8 7 No longer is there an area
of purely local activity which is not in some way inextricably intertwined
with the national economy.88 In today's world, every problem has a na-
tional economic dimension and thus falls within the authority the Com-
merce Clause gives Congress.
Therefore, fidelity to the Commerce Clause now requires that Con-
gress have authority to regulate crime - even ordinary street crime. Ac-
cording to the most recent and authoritative estimate, crime costs the
nation approximately $500 billion per year.89 Even if these costs are
categorized according to particular crimes or types of crimes, they re-
main quite substantial. 90
87 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).
88 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497
(1994) ("[B]etween the Civil War and World War I the economies of the separate states be-
came functionally integrated."); Robert F. Nagel. The Future of Federalism, 46 CAsE W. RES.
L. REy. 643, 647 (1996) ("[It is logically possible - even as a practical matter highly likely
- that such everyday matters as the quality of family (or public schooling) do affect produc-
tivity."). Even "conservative" scholars who advocate judicially enforceable lines between
state and national authority recognize that, in today's world, essentially all aspects of one
State's economic life are inextricably intertwined with the economic lives of its sister States.
See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 5 (1995); Stephen G. Calabresi, "A Gov-
ernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 752, 783 (1995); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper
Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIGO L. REV. 555, 567 (1994).
89 See supra note 9. According to the previous best estimate, which was the product of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, "in 1965 the
total costs of crime and the criminal justice system... equaled about 3 percent of the gross
national product." Philip J. Cook, Costs of Crime, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
373, 373 (S. A. Kadish ed., 1983).
90 See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 580 (3d Cir. 1995) (reporting congressional
findings on the extent and significance of auto theft); MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 17, 24
(breaking down annual costs according to particular crimes); CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMI-
NAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSicE 42 (1978) (placing economic losses associated with shop-
lifting and employee theft at over nine billion dollars in 1974); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME: 24 RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14
(1992) [hereinafter COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME]. See also Beale, supra note 1, at 1007 ("It
would be naive to deny that there is a federal interest - and, indeed, a significant effect on
commerce - as a result of violent street crime.").
One might object that Congress should be denied regulatory authority on the grounds that
a particular offense does not have a significant impact on the national economy as a whole.
Such a limiting principle, however, has obviously unacceptable implications. A single state's
tariff on a particular kind of out-of-state good would have an even less significant impact on
the national economy. Yet, as everyone would acknowledge, authority to preempt such a tariff
is within the core of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Indeed, even when Congress has
not legislated, the Court has held that such state tariffs violate the Commerce Clause because
of their adverse impact on the national economy. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery v. Healy,
114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (1994) ("[T]ariffs against the products of other States are so patently
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Lopez illustrates this point. In his dissent, Justice Breyer cited more
than one hundred and fifty academic and governmental sources to sup-
port his conclusion that the presence of guns in and near schools, the
subject over which Congress had given the national government concur-
rent authority, has a significant adverse impact on interstate commerce. 91
The majority's rebuttal to Breyer was ineffective, even lacking in convic-
tion. Although the Court complained that Justice Breyer's analysis had
"pile[d] inference upon inference,"92 it tellingly did not attempt to dis-
pute any of these inferences. 93 As Professor Robert Nagel observed, "the
Court's analysis effectively concedes that regulation of guns near schools
would have a substantial effect on commerce. '94
Instead of denying the national economic consequences of the activ-
ity Congress had criminalized, the majority reiterated the principle of
limited national economic power. The Court repeatedly stressed that if
the adverse economic effects Justice Breyer identified constitute a suffi-
cient basis for congressional regulation, then Congress's commerce
power has no meaningful limits. 95 The Court's point is quite correct:
Given the pervasive interdependence of the modem American economy,
Congress's Commerce Clause power to address significant national eco-
nomic problems is now essentially all-encompassing. 96 Justice Breyer
unsurprisingly lacked an effective rejoinder to the Court's charge that he
unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to enact one."); Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
91 115 S. Ct. 1624, at 1665-71 (1995). Justice Breyer maintained that these sources
support the conclusions that 1) the problem of guns in and around schools is widespread and
adversely affects the quality of education; 2) the quality of education significantly influences
interstate and foreign commerce; and 3) gun-related violence on or near school premises has a
significant adverse impact on interstate and foreign commerce. Id. at 1659-61.
92 Id. at 1634.
93 See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Inci-
dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 554, 563 (1995) (that standard
Commerce Clause doctrine "justiffies] the Gun-Free School Zones Act seems undeniable").
The Court could not have meant to suggest seriously that the chain of economic causation
Justice Breyer traced out is untrue because it piles inference upon inference. Due to the inter-
dependence and almost overwhelming complexity of the national economy, any effort to iso-
late the effect of one causal factor will necessarily pile inference upon inference. Indeed,
widely accepted and sophisticated techniques of social and economic analysis, such as multi
variate regression analysis, are premised on the notion that such complicated causal chains do
exist.
94 See Nagel, supra note 88, at 647.
95 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29, 1632, 1633. See also Merritt, supra note 63, at 686-90; H.
Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 651, 654-58
(1995). Almost a quarter century earlier, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Perez v. United States,
made essentially the same point respecting modem Commerce Clause doctrine. 402 U.S. at
157-58.
96 See supra note 61.
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was "unable to identify any activity that the States may regulate but Con-
gress may not."97
As Lopez nicely illustrates, both the Constitution's text and history
embrace principles that the modem world has thrown into conflict. 98 In
its half-hearted and unconvincing denial of consequences to the national
economy, the Court's opinion reveals that loyalty to the Tenth Amend-
ment principle of limited national power compromises Congress's Com-
merce Clause authority to address national economic problems. In its
inability to identify any limits on Congress's Commerce Clause author-
ity, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion reveals that complete loyalty to
the Commerce Clause compromises the Tenth Amendment's principle of
limited national power. It sacrifices candor and constitutional principle
to pretend, as the majority did, that imposing limits on national crime
fighting does not compromise Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
But it also sacrifices candor and constitutional principle to pretend, as the
dissent did, that upholding Congress's full Commerce Clause authority
preserves the Tenth Amendment's principle of limits on national power.
Both the proponents of the overfederalization thesis and the Jus-
tices, then, are wrong to rely upon the Constitution's text and history
when imposing limits on national crime fighting. Of course, it is also
wrong to rely upon text and history to deny that such limits exist. The
text embraces both the principles of limited national power and of na-
tional power to address significant impediments to an effective interstate
economy.99 Neither text nor history resolves the modem conflict be-
97 115 S. Ct. at 1632. However, instead of responding directly and persuasively to the
majority's challenge to identify limits on Congress's Commerce Clause authority, the dissent
sought to turn the tables. It accused the majority of inconsistency with the unbroken lines of
cases over the last sixty years that recognize Congress's Commerce Clause authority to ad-
dress national economic problems. Id. at 1662-64.
98 In her dissenting opinion in Garcia, Justice O'Connor recognized the conflict and
explained its genesis. 469 U.S. at 581. In subsequent cases and in Lopez, however, Justice
O'Connor and the other Justices have pretended that the conflict does not exist. In New York
v. United States, for instance, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, declared: "Our task....
consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and apply-
ing the framework set forth in the Constitution." 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992). Yet, as Justice
O'Connor herself acknowledged in Garcia, it is not possible to follow the principles laid down
at the founding because those principles conflict in the modem world.
Like the Justices, scholars tend to ignore or evade the conflict. See, e.g., MARIN H.
REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 50-51 (1995); TRIE, supra note 61 § 5-
7, at 313. For exceptions, see Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem
of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 922 (1988); Nagel, supra note 88, at 649-55.
99 See Nagel, supra note 88, at 649 ("[O]ur Constitution only authorizes certain enumer-
ated powers for the national government, but also authorizes some enumerated powers that are
broad enough to allow congressional control over any aspect of human affairs."); Jesse H.
Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Right Movement Within the Supreme
Court"?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 663, 669 (1996).
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tween the two, for in the founders' localized world, the conflict did not
exist.
B. TRADITION
In part, both the proponents of the overfederalization thesis and the
Lopez majority appeal to societal tradition as a reason to limit national
involvement in crime fighting. Before Lopez, scholars pointed to the rel-
atively few federal criminal offenses during this nation's first century.100
Striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act, the Lopez Court likewise
invoked societal tradition, twice emphasizing that "[s]tates have histori-
cally been sovereign" in the enforcement of the criminal law.' 0 '
In fact, the very effort to impose constitutional limits leads natu-
rally, if not necessarily, to a reliance upon tradition. Although the Tenth
100 Brickey, supra note I, at 1138-41; Mengler, supra note 1, at 508-10; Miner, supra
note 1, at 119-23.
Until the Civil War, federal criminal law was limited to the crimes specifically mentioned
in the Constitution and a narrow list of additional crimes. These additional crimes involved
conduct that was not within the jurisdiction of any State and was directed against and harmful
to the national government itself. Two of these crimes were perjury in federal court and brib-
ery of a federal judge. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 71, 261-62; Beale, supra note 1, at 775-
76.
[Flor example, the Crimes Act of 1790 punished murder and other crimes committed
in a fort or other place controlled by the federal government, crimes committed
outside the jurisdiction of any state, forgery of United States certificates and other
public securities, perjury in federal court, treason, piracy, and committing acts of
violence against an ambassador.
Brickey, supra note I, at 1138.
It was not until after the Civil War that Congress first began to invoke, in very limited
fashion, the Commerce Clause as authority to criminalize private conduct not directed against
the national government itself and within the states' traditional police powers. Civil rights
concerns prompted the Reconstruction Congress to enact statutes that gave the national gov-
ernment concurrent jurisdiction over some criminal conduct that was traditionally subject to
state law. Brickey, supra note 1, at 1139-40. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to resolve all doubts concerning the constitutionality of such civil rights legislation.
In the years after the enactment of such civil rights inspired crimes, Congress criminalized
some conduct involving the use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as rail-
roads. "For example, the interstate transportation of explosives and of cattle with contagious
diseases was made criminal." Beale, supra note 1, at 777.
Significant reliance on Congress's commerce power to federalize criminal conduct that
was traditionally governed only by state law did not begin until the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. For example, in 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which criminal-
izes monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and agreements to restrain trade which affect
interstate commerce; in 1910, it enacted the Mann Act, which prohibits transportation of wo-
men across state lines for purposes of prostitution; and in 1919, it enacted the National Motor
Vehicle Act of 1919, which prohibits interstate transportation of stolen vehicles. See Beale,
supra note 1, at 777; Brickey, supra note 1, at 1142; Mengler, supra note 1, at 510-12. See
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 262, 262-67 (The level of national involvement "changed
dramatically in the twentieth century").
For general discussions of the history of federal offenses, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at
71-73, 261-76; Beale, supra note 22, at 775-79.
101 115 S. Ct. at 1631, 1632 n.3.
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Amendment embraces the principle of limited national power, it makes
no effort to delineate those limits. It says merely that "[t]he powers not
delegated by the United States by the Constitution... are reserved to the
States ... ."102 According to this text, then, the scope of the limits on
national authority depends not on a standard the Tenth Amendment spec-
ifies, but rather a construction of the powers the Constitution delegates to
the national government.'0 3 In the words of the well-known aphorism,
"The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered." 104 In light of the pervasive interdependence of the
modem economy, however, the Court is now unable to rely on the proper
and natural ambit of the Commerce Clause as a basis for establishing
limits on national authority. 10 5 In this way, modem conflict between the
Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause pushes the Court away
from the Constitution's text and towards tradition.
In this section, we identify a number of reasons why tradition is not
a sound basis for imposing constitutional limits on national anti-crime
measures. The previous section has already identified one reason: Im-
posing such limits compromises Congress's authority to address signifi-
cant national economic problems - authority that the Commerce Clause
actually grants Congress. But two other sets of reasons also counsel
against relying upon tradition. One set focuses on the inherently unprin-
cipled nature of using tradition. The other set implies that, even if it
were principled, using tradition lacks legitimacy.
First, the difficulties of defining, identifying, and using tradition
make relying upon it standardless. Tradition is notoriously difficult to
define. How long must a practice exist for it to quality as a tradition?
For instance, in the early part of this century Congress enacted the Dyer
Act, 106 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehi-
cles. Has that Act been in place long enough to qualify as a tradition?
Another question concerns the sources from which tradition may be
inferred. Although the Dyer Act has been in place for more than three-
quarters of a century, it has been the source of relatively few federal
102 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The full text: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
103 See Jean Yarbrough, Federalism and Rights in the American Founding, in FEDERAL-
ISM AND RioGrs 57, 64 (E. Katz & G. A. Tarr eds., 1996) ("The Constitution enumerates only
those powers which the national government may exercise and says nothing about those pow-
ers which rightly belong to the states.").
104 The aphorism derives from United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See
also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (1992) (restating the aphorism with
approval).
105 See supra notes 61, 82-97, and accompanying text.
106 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-13 (1919) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles).
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prosecutions over the last two decades.10 7 What, then, is the relationship
between the formal law and informal enforcement practices? May the
recent practice of not enforcing the Dyer Act furnish the basis for infer-
ring a tradition of exclusive state authority over auto theft? And if en-
forcement practices do not themselves constitute tradition, may they
nonetheless prevent the law's unenforced terms from establishing a
tradition? 10 8
Still another problem concerns the generality at which a tradition
may be defined and used. For instance, may one identify the reasons
behind a practice and then use these reasons to define the tradition?
Does the Dyer Act furnish a basis for inferring a tradition of national
involvement in fighting criminal activity that constitutes a significant
threat to the nation's economy? Or only when there is a threat to the
nation's transportation system? Or must a tradition of national involve-
ment be defined as narrowly as possible so that the Dyer Act establishes
a tradition of national involvement in fighting the transport of motor ve-
hicles across state lines, but not a broader tradition of fighting autotheft
generally?
In addition to the difficulty of defining tradition, there is the perva-
sive problem of arguable counter-traditions. As a leading scholar of the
federal courts has aptly observed, "there are a series of traditions about
the allocation of authority between state and federal courts. These tradi-
tions are multifaceted and rich, permitting a range of normative claims to
be couched in historical practices but varying significantly."' 0 9
In Lopez, for example, the Court, while pointing to a broadly de-
fined tradition of state sovereignty respecting the general enforcement of
criminal laws,110 arbitrarily ignored several other traditions of arguable
greater pertinence. The Gun-Free School Zones Act can be linked to
national involvement in the regulation of firearms, a practice which
traces back to 1934.111 Because the problem of gun violence in schools
107 Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 695.
108 Thus, one might say that the Dyer Act, during the years in which it was vigorously
enforced, established a tradition of national involvement in combating auto-theft; that the sub-
sequent nonenforcement of the Act negated the existence of this prior tradition; that this non-
enforcement does not itself rise to the level of a tradition; and, therefore, that there is now no
tradition at all answering whether States have exclusive authority over auto-theft.
The complexity of the above analysis, coupled with the absence of any persuasive reason
for undertaking it, highlights the absurdity of relying upon tradition.
109 Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Se-
lective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 171, 217-18 (1995). For an
extended and illuminating discussion of the problems associated with tradition-based claims
about the proper spheres of federal and state jurisdiction, see id. at 217-240.
110 115 S. Ct. at 1631, 1632 n.3.
111 For a recitation of the history of national firearms legislation, see United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348-60 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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is particularly acute in poor urban areas,"12 the Act also can be viewed as
part of longstanding efforts by the national government to assist states
with various problems of poverty, efforts which began with the New
Deal in the 1930s and extended beyond the Great Society programs of
the 1960s. 113 Given the disproportionate impact of violence in schools
on African Americans,'" 4 the Act also can be seen as part of the national
government's traditional role in promoting racial equality. Like the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, the other federal offenses that vex judges and
scholars can be linked to traditions of national authority."15
What is the proper response to the existence of conflicting traditions
such as these? One possible response would be to deny their existence.
On the facts of Lopez, for instance, one might object that the traditions
we identified in the preceding paragraph are defined too generally." 6
Yet the tradition on which the Court relied, state sovereignty over the
criminal law, was defined with extreme generality. While characterizing
the tradition of national gun control with arbitrary narrowness and
thereby dismissing its relevance," t7 the Court characterized the tradition
112 See infra note 212.
113 See infra notes 185, 261, and accompanying text.
114 See infra note 215.
115 The federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, can be linked to the tradition of
national authority over auto-theft, which was commenced by enactment of the Dyer Act in
1919, see supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. The carjacking statute can also be seen
to spring from the more general tradition of national involvement with the nation's transporta-
tion system, which arguably can be traced back to federal support for canals in the early 1800s.
The Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228, which makes it a federal crime for a
parent in one state willfully to fail paying support owed for a child who resides in another
state, can be traced to a tradition of national authority over lawbreakers who cross state lines.
See infra note 241.
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), can be seen to flow
from the tradition of national firearms regulation, see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
The Violence Against Woman Act, 18 U.S.C. §2262, can be linked to the national gov-
ernment's roles in promoting equality of disadvantaged groups, which can be traced back to
the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra Part III.B.3, and the nation's role in helping States ad-
dress the problems of poverty, which extends back to the New Deal, see infra note 261.
For a discussion of the relationship between these offenses and federalism's underlying
values, see infra Part III.D.
116 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) ("We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified."). But see 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor & Kennedy, Js., concurring in
all but this aspect of Justice Scalia's majority opinion); 491 U.S. at 136, 137-41 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with this aspect of Justice Scalia's majority opinion).
117 The Lopez Court quoted approvingly from the Fifth Circuit's opinion below, which
described the Gun-Free School Zones Act as "'a sharp break with the longstanding pattern of
federal firearms legislation."' 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The Fifth Circuit saw the Act as a break
from the pattern of federal firearms legislation because it "abjures any express nexus to inter-
state commerce or other federal element nor any express or implied Congressional finding
about mere possession of ordinary firearms absent such a nexus." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1358.
It is quite arbitrary to define the "tradition" of national gun control in terms of such
specific congressional findings or jurisdictional nexus. Inserting a jurisdictional clause that
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on which it relied in arbitrarily broad terms when it spoke of state sover-
eignty in the entire domain of criminal law. As the facts of Lopez illus-
trate, any effort to deny categorically that conflicting traditions exist
seems implausible, if not disingenuous. Because the "propensity to hold
contradictory ideas simultaneously is one of the most significant qualities
of the American political mind at all stages of national history,"' s com-
peting traditions can very frequently be identified at different levels of
generality.'19
As a consequence of these various difficulties, the use of tradition is
inherently manipulable and unprincipled. As many prominent scholars
and some Justices have recognized, a tradition-bound approach necessar-
ily "imports values surreptitiously - claiming, all the while, only to be
discovering values that are, as it were, out there in societal traditions
.... 120 Because "tradition can be invoked in support of almost any
cause,"' 21 it can and will be used to constitutionalize conclusions whose
real basis is disguised and unanalyzed.
Second, even if a principled methodology were developed for doing
so, reliance upon tradition would remain objectionable. For one thing, it
is self defeating to give tradition the force of constitutional law. In ordi-
nary life, tradition carries significant, but not decisive, normative force.
In the law of negligence, for example, adhering to industry custom is
evidence of reasonableness, but it is not dispositive.' 22 The prospect of a
departure from tradition may warrant hesitation and reconsideration, but
few people follow tradition blindly for its own sake. At the heart of the
pragmatic spirit that pervades American history is a willingness to depart
from tradition when there is good reason to do so. Ironically, giving
tradition binding effect violates the longstanding American tradition of
according tradition presumptive but not conclusive weight.
requires a case-by-case showing that the gun(s) in question has moved in interstate commerce
would be devoid of any real meaning. Virtually all firearms are manufactured out-of-state or
contain component parts that are manufactured out-of-state. Congressional findings of a link
to interstate commerce are likewise a matter of form rather than substance. Congress can
always make such findings. See. infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
118 ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 13 (1960).
119 See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 165 (1988);
Jack M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1613, 1617-18, 1624 (1990).
120 LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICmEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTrrTnON 106
(1991). See also Michael H, 491 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); JOHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DIS'RUST 60-63 (1980); Balkin, supra note 98, at 1617-18, 1624; Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161, 1171-74 (1988).
121 ELY, supra note 120, at 60.
122 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 167-68 (4th ed. 1971).
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In addition, according tradition the status of constitutional law lacks
legitimacy. This practice does not have the legitimacy of positive law,
for it is nowhere codified in the Constitution and, unlike the Constitu-
tion's text, it was never adopted by supermajorities of the electorate. Nor
does the practice have the legitimacy of a justified normative
principle.12 3
Finally, even a principled reliance upon tradition would prevent de-
sirable and legitimate adaptation to historical change. Ordinary practice
and morality do not accord tradition decisive force partly because tradi-
tions become tired and outlive their usefulness. The same is true in the
context of constitutional federalism. Many commentators think that,
with the rise and increasing integration of the national economy, it has
been desirable and legitimate for Congress's regulatory power to expand.
As a result of changes over history, the activity that is properly denomi-
nated "commerce among the States" has expanded in both absolute and
relative terms. Yet if the Court had consistently policed the relationship
between this nation and its States for adherence to tradition, then this
legitimate expansion of national power could not have occurred.
A jurisprudence of tradition can allow desirable adaptation to histor-
ical change only by undermining itself. Adaptation to historical change
becomes possible only if the courts do not consistently enforce tradition
and selectively countenance changes that dissolve old traditions. How-
ever, a jurisprudence that depends on selective nonadherence for its via-
bility and acceptability is fundamentally incoherent. Adaptation could be
permitted by defining traditions according to their underlying reasons,
whose applicability changes with history. Thus, the national govern-
ment's very limited role in crime-fighting before the Civil War might be
characterized in terms of the absence back then of a significant connec-
tion between crime and the national economy and in terms of the absence
of any need for national involvement. If, however, traditions should be
characterized according to their underlying reasons, then the focus ulti-
mately should be on only those reasons, not on the traditions.
Tradition thus constitutes a very poor basis for limitations on na-
tional crime-fighting. Due to the malleability of defining tradition and
the necessity of departing from it to adapt to changing circumstances, the
use of tradition is inherently unprincipled. The practice lacks warrant in
the Constitution's text and itself defies the enduring American tradition
of pragmatic experimentalism. If constitutional limits on national crime-
fighting are justifiable, surely more can be said for them than a dubious
appeal to tradition.
123 As the American tradition of according traditions only presumptive weight would in-
dicate, tradition is normatively justified only when it is supported (or at least not undermined
by) good reasons.
CRIME
I. THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALISM'S UNDERLYING
VALUES
The only principled answer to the Constitution's stance on national
crime-fighting comes from federalism's underlying values. One cannot
rely on the text for answers. Modem economic transformations have
precipitated a conflict between the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause. But one can look behind this conflict to the values the textual
prescriptions are intended to enshrine. 124 In contrast with changing tradi-
tions, these values have explicit textual mooring and derive a much
greater degree of legitimacy from the text. Constitutional conclusions
based upon these values also derive legitimacy from reason. Whereas an
approach that selectively identifies tradition disguises the reasoning un-
derlying the conclusions, 1' relying upon federalism's values exposes
and structures that reasoning. In addition, an approach that appeals to
federalism's values seeks to justify conclusions based upon reasons, not
blind obedience to tradition.
In this Part, we argue that, although federalism's values have illumi-
nating and important implications, those implications are actually the re-
verse of the ones that devotees of the overfederalization thesis see. In
general, federalism's underlying rationales decisively support rather than
undermine a concurrent national crime-fighting role. In fact, the case for
national crime-fighting is strongest where the Justices and scholars be-
lieve it is the weakest: violent street crime that plagues poor urban areas.
This conclusion has extremely important implications. In the
months since Lopez was handed down, some lower courts have invali-
dated recently enacted federal criminal statutes that target firearms, do-
mestic violence, willful failure to pay child support, and carjacking.
Instead of relying upon the formalistic categories that Lopez announces,
as these courts have done, courts should resolve the modem conflict be-
tween the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause in accordance
with federalism's underlying values.' 2 6 It follows, we show, that the
constitutionality of all of the new federal offenses mentioned above
should be upheld.127
A. RATIONALES FOR STATE AUTHORITY
Why is it a good thing for states to have exclusive authority? One
answer might be that such authority is an essential attribute of state soy-
124 For general discussions of federalism's normative values, see, for example, Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991); SHAPIRO, supra note 88; Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (1987) (book review).
125 See supra Part II.B.
126 See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
127 See infra Part III.D.
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ereignty. This answer, however, is unsatisfactory. It is unclear which, if
any, attributes genuinely constitute sovereignty 2 8 and, in any event, such
attributes now conflict with Congress's Commerce Clause authority. In
addition, as the Supreme Court declared in New York v. United States,129
"The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of the States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or
even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States." 130 State
sovereignty instead is meant to benefit the People(s): the electoral ma-
jorities to whom state governments must be accountable under the Re-
publican Guarantee Clause. 131
The Justices and scholars have thus sought to identify the ways ex-
clusive state authority can promote the interests of the People(s) whom
federalism is meant to serve. Exclusive state authority, it is widely
thought, generally promotes values such as diversity, experimentation,
accountability, and liberty. 132 According to the conventional wisdom
among judges and academics, federalizing crime undermines these val-
ues.' 33 This view, we believe, greatly exaggerates the degree to which
these values militate against a concurrent national crime-fighting role.
Further, it completely overlooks the extent to which these values actually
favor such a role.
1. Diversity
When views about the wisdom of a particular policy differ from
region to region and state to state, more voters can be satisfied by leaving
the choice to the states.' 34 Proponents of the overfederalization thesis
maintain that this interest in diversity strongly favors state authority over
128 See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341.
129 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
130 Id. at 2431-32.
131 See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
132 For useful general discussions of the various rationales for state authority, see Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991); SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 75-94. See generally
McConnell, supra note 124.
133 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 1, at 994-95; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1247, 1249, 1251;
Marshall, supra note 1, at 720; Mengler, supra note 1, at 516-17; Miner, supra note 1, at 127.
Those commentators who wrote before Lopez did not appeal to these values to demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of efforts to federalize crime. Given the apparently settled constitutional
doctrine according Congress unlimited power, see supra note 61 and accompanying text, these
commentators instead sought to show that the trend of federalizing crime is unwise as a matter
of policy. But after Lopez, the appeal to federalism's values may take on its more natural form
as a constitutional argument.
134 See, e.g., Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2399; McConnell, supra note 124, at 1493.
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criminal law because "criminal law [is] an expression of local mores and
concerns"1 35 which can vary from region to region and state to state.136
With respect to the overwhelming bulk of matters now within fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction, however, interest in diversity carries very little
weight. Diversity would constitute a good reason for leaving the
criminalization of gambling or abortion exclusively to the States. Views
over the propriety of criminalizing these matters differ, sometimes quite
sharply, from State to State. Public opinion, however, does not differ
from State to State or region to region respecting the criminalization of
autotheft, narcotics, carjacking, or violent street crime in general. By
and large, the national government's crime-fighting efforts, particularly
those addressed to violent street crime, target criminal activity that the
public uniformly and strongly opposes. In such a context, state authority
is not needed to accommodate diverse beliefs about whether the activity
should be criminal.
Because views sometimes differ from state to state about appropri-
ate punishment, the interest in diversity does have some limited applica-
tion, even when virtually everyone agrees that the activity should be
criminalized. The death penalty is a favorite example. 137 When Con-
gress makes that penalty available for a crime over which the States have
concurrent jurisdiction, federal prosecutors and juries can "override the
decisions of fourteen states and the District of Columbia to ban capital
punishment." 138
Even respecting the death penalty, however, the value of diversity is
very limited. First, that punishment is not available for the vast bulk of
federal offenses. For instance, the death penalty was not available under
the Gun-Free School Zones Act which was struck down by Lopez.139
Even where it is available, the death penalty is sought and imposed in
very few cases. 140 In addition, even where the national government has
concurrent jurisdiction, the overwhelming bulk of criminal offenses con-
tinues to be prosecuted in state court under state law.14' These various
limiting factors help explain why the presence of the death penalty in
135 Brickey, supra note 1, at 1138.
136 Id. at 1138-39: "Louisiana was free to legalize lotteries while Utah chose to outlaw
them. Nevada could boost its economy by permitting prostitution and casino gambling while
New Hampshire could ban them." See also Beale, supra note 1, at 995; Neil H. Cogan, The
Rules of Everyday Life, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 97, 101-02 (1996); Men-
gler, supra note 1, at 516.
137 See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 136, at 101; Brickey, supra note 1, at 1166-67.
138 Brickey, supra note 1, at 1166-67.
139 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4) (1990) (providing for fine and/or imprisonment of not more
than 5 years).
140 There have been no federal executions since 1963.
141 See supra Part I.A.
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federal law has never been treated as sufficient for denying the national
government a concurrent role in enforcing the criminal law. 142
2. Experimentation
On the surface, it seems reasonable to argue that there is great value
in permitting States to experiment with ways of combating crime that
everyone would like to see eradicated. 143 In his Lopez concurrence, for
instance, Justice Kennedy made such an argument. After identifying a
variety of measures for addressing the problem of guns in the schools, he
opined that "[tihe statute now before us forecloses [s]tates from experi-
menting and exercising their own judgment" respecting those meas-
ures. 1 44 Other critics likewise maintain that federalizing crime tends to
subvert the value of experimentation by establishing a uniform national
regulatory scheme. 145 Despite its appealingly pragmatic ring, however,
experimentation has been much overblown as a reason for favoring ex-
clusive state authority over crime. In fact, it is best seen as favoring a
concurrent national role.
By invoking experimentation as a reason to favor exclusive state
authority, Justice Kennedy and other proponents of the overfederaliza-
tion thesis have failed to appreciate the crucial difference between exclu-
sive and concurrent authority. If the national government were seeking
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, then federal criminal offenses such as
the Gun-Free School Zone Act would indeed preempt state experimenta-
tion. Enacting federal offenses would substitute a single national regula-
tory scheme for the diverse schemes of the separate states. In expanding
national crime fighting efforts, however, Congress has given the national
government concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction. Although the use and
distribution of narcotics and the interstate transport of stolen vehicles are
federal crimes, the national government has no monopoly over drug and
auto-theft prosecutions. Indeed, the states continue to handle the bulk of
such prosecutions.146 So the choice presented by national crime fighting
is not between exclusive state and exclusive national authority, as the
142 To the limited extent it is implicated, the value of promoting diversity through exclu-
sive state jurisdiction must be balanced against the values furthered by giving the national
government a concurrent role.
143 Although the founders apparently never advanced the idea, case law and commentary
on federalism is laced with approving references to the States as "laboratories of experimenta-
tion." The standard citation is to Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., RaDISH, supra note
98, at 25; SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 85-88.
144 115 S. Ct. at 1641.
145 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 1, at 994; Mengler, supra note 1, at 517.
146 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL 161 (1992) (reporting that "about 30 percent of those in prison for drug offenses
during 1986 were in federal prisons").
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proponents of the overfederalization too often imply. Rather, it is be-
tween exclusive state authority and overlapping state and national
authority.
A concurrent national role leaves the states free, so far as their own
law is concerned, to experiment with the other methods of eradicating
activity also proscribed by federal law. The Gun-Free School Zones Act,
for instance, did not preclude the states from trying any of the alternative
regulatory measures Justice Kennedy identified in his concurrence. A
federal law that gives the national government a concurrent role
preempts the states only from trying to legitimize the conduct in ques-
tion. Of course, states do not wish to experiment with this alternative,
especially with respect to street crime.
A concurrent national role not only permits state experimentation
respecting crime control methods, but also advances rather than subverts
the underlying goal of experimentation. The public regards crime, par-
ticularly violent street crime, as a serious problem and wants it
stopped.147 In this context, the goal of experimentation is stopping or
minimizing crime. Joint state and national efforts can be expected to go
further toward accomplishing this goal than state efforts alone.148
3. Liberty
Several commentators contend that national crime fighting endan-
gers liberty.149 The heady question of whether state or national authority
better promotes liberty is quite complex and permits no definitive answer
for all contexts. 150 In this context, however, a concurrent national role
would seem to enhance rather than threaten liberty.
Federal prosecution neither infringes unjustifiably on the liberty of
criminal defendants nor threatens to undermine, the liberty of defendants
in a procedural sense. Such defendants will have the fair procedures re-
quired by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the other,
147 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
148 Of course, overlapping state and national regulatory schemes carry costs that might
support a prudent judgment to give either the States or the national government exclusive
authority. But whether joint state and national authority produces benefits that outweigh its
costs seems a decision peculiarly within the province of voters. It would be inappropriate for
the Court to decide as a matter of constitutional law that, despite its greater effectiveness,
concurrent state and national authority cannot be employed because of its greater costs.
149 Beale, supra note 1, at 995 ('The concentration of power in an integrated national
police force might pose a greater threat to individual liberty."); Calabresi, supra note 88, at
803; Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 108 ('The fear of a single national police, such as
many democracies have, has always been deep in the United States."). But see Mengler, supra
note 1, at 517 ("[T]he specter of a national police force has haunted few (except perhaps the
paranoid) since the sixties.").
150 See Tom Stacy, Does Federalism Promote Liberty?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15
(1996).
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more specific procedural guarantees specified in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Moreover, federal prosecution does not threaten to de-
prive defendants of liberty in a substantive sense. Whether state or fed-
eral, the criminal law generally infringes on the liberty of defendants
justifiably. The infringements of trial and punishment are triggered by
the defendant's unjustified invasion into the liberty of others.15'
Further, a concurrent national role would seem to promote overall
liberty by bettering the enforcement of the criminal law. By inflicting
injury to persons and property, crime diminishes the opportunities and
effective liberty of its actual victims. By forcing potential victims to take
costly and opportunity-sacrificing precautions to avoid becoming vic-
tims, crime also diminishes the effective liberty of potential victims.' 52
As compared with leaving enforcement exclusively to the States, a sup-
plemental national role can be expected to improve enforcement due to
the increased resources made available and the greater size and coordina-
tion of national law enforcement agencies. To the extent that it does so,
a supplemental national crime fighting role increases overall liberty by
preventing would-be criminals from invading the liberty of many other
people. The liberty-enhancing effect of the criminal law coupled with
the contribution of a concurrent national role would seem especially im-
portant in the context of street crime, which, by taking life and invading
bodily integrity, constitutes a particularly grave infringement upon
liberty.
Perhaps there is some legitimate cause for concern that national
crime fighting will threaten liberty by swelling the ranks of national law
enforcement agencies.15 3 Such centralized agencies might pose a greater
danger of oppression than the smaller, more numerous, and less coordi-
nated state and local police departments. This speculative danger, how-
ever, hardly justifies a constitutional rule of exclusive state jurisdiction,
which would preclude the electorate from balancing that danger against
the possible liberty-enhancing effects of a concurrent national role.
151 See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (dis-
cussed in chapter three).
152 See Cook, supra note 89, at 373:
Crime reduces our standard of living. The prices of consumer goods are inflated by
shoplifting, employee theft, embezzlement, antitrust violations, and extortion of le-
gitimate businesses by organized crime. The fear of household burglary and street
crime motivates us to make large expenditures on self-protection and insurance. Our
tax bills reflect the pervasive crimes of income-tax evasion and government program
fraud, as well as the necessity of supporting public law enforcement efforts.
153 See supra note 149.
[Vol. 6:247
1997] CRIME 283
4. Participation
According to those who claim that the criminal law already has
been overfederalized, exclusive state authority promotes the democratic
virtues of participation and accountability. 154 It does so by vesting au-
thority with state and local prosecutors over whom the public has greater
control and influence. 155 Yet, as with the values of experimentation and
liberty, a concurrent national role would seem to promote rather than
impinge upon democratic participation and accountability.
As with experimentation, the arguments made by proponents of the
overfederalization thesis fail to appreciate the distinction between exclu-
sive and concurrent authority. It may well be true that exclusive state
authority over crime promotes participation and accountability better
than exclusive national authority. The crucial issue, however, is whether
exclusive state authority promotes these values better than concurrent
state and national authority.
Compared with exclusive state authority, supplemental national au-
thority seems to expand rather than contract opportunities for participa-
tion and accountability. When the national government has concurrent
authority, the electorate can still hold state and local officials responsible
for inadequate efforts to curb crime. Although the national government
now has concurrent jurisdiction over much criminal activity, state and
local governments still account for over 90% of all enforcement ef-
forts. 156 Concurrent national authority has not prevented crime from be-
coming an issue on subnational levels. State and local officials continue
to be held accountable for a failure to respond to the electorate's con-
cerns.157 In fact, because it enables national officials to be held responsi-
154 For discussions of this point with respect to federalism generally, see, for example,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991); REDISH, supra note 98, at 25; McConnell,
supra note 124, at 1509-10.
155 Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 104; Beale, supra note 1, at 994-95; Mengler,
supra note 1, at 517.
156 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 16.
157 Some Justices and scholars have expressed a concern that concurrent authority blurs
the lines of political accountability. See, e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy &
O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinary: May Con-
gress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. Rv. 1001
(1995). Voters, the Justices presumably fear, will be confused about which level of govern-
ment is accountable for failing to act in an area of concurrent authority.
As an empirical matter, such confusion hardly seems so widespread or significant that it
merits judicial intervention. Because the Court has long held that Congress and the States
have concurrent authority over interstate commerce, such confusion has had ample time to
fester and manifest itself. Yet neither the Justices nor commentators have cited any empirical
evidence that it is a serious problem. Indeed, leading political science texts on American
democracy nowhere mention the supposed problem. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNrrED STATES (4th ed. 1981).
Beyond its lack of empirical support, the voter confusion argument suffers from two other
problems. The heart of the voter confusion argument is that concurrent authority breeds con-
284 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ble as well, concurrent national authority can be seen to expand
opportunities for participation and accountability.158
In addition, a concurrent national role in criminal law enforcement
seems to promote the overriding goal that, in this context, underlies the
values of participation and accountability. In some contexts, the electo-
rate presumably values both accountability and participation in and of
themselves. Even when they do not like the outcome of the political
process, people regard participation or the opportunity to participate as
fusion and that an effective federal democracy requires clearly defined zones of exclusive state
and national authority. The argument thus carries the radical implication that the Court should
overturn the longstanding and now uncontroversial principle that Congress and the States have
concurrent authority over interstate commerce.
In addition, although the voter confusion argument asserts that concurrent authority frus-
trates accountability, concurrent authority in one important way actually promotes accountabil-
ity. As Madison emphasized and our nation's history teaches, voters can hold officials
accountable by shifting power vertically to and from the state and national levels. See infra
notes 260-61 and accompanying text. Exclusive zones of authority, however, preclude the
voters from holding officials accountable in this way.
The concern that concurrent state and national authority might confuse voters and blur
lines of accountability is worth further investigation. But so far the case has not been made
that this concern justifies a constitutional bar against concurrent authority in general or in the
crime fighting context.
158 One might object that this argument is flawed because it assumes that national in-
volvement increases the overall resources available for law enforcement. The question, one
might maintain, is not whether participation and accountability are enhanced by devoting na-
tional resources in addition to state resources. Rather, the question is whether, at any given
level of resource expenditure, participation and accountability are maximized by exclusive
state deployment of those resources. Because state and local prosecutorial decisions are closer
to the people, this objection would conclude, exclusive state deployment maximizes participa-
tion and accountability.
While certainly plausible on its face, this objection overlooks the problems of collective
action that impel states not to devote sufficient resources to enforcement efforts. See infra Part
III.B.4. As a result of these collective problems, the choice is not whether to devote a given
level of resources to exclusive state deployment or joint national and state deployment.
Rather, it is whether to deploy national resources in addition to state resources. See Zimring &
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 26 (noting the tendency of federal involvement to supplement rather
than supplant state involvement). The additional deployment of national resources can expand
opportunities for participation and accountability.
Still, one might object that the additional national resources could be channeled into state
systems in the form of federal funding rather than being used to support national police, prose-
cutors, courts, and prisons. While this objection is true, it is not at all clear that, as compared
with national enforcement efforts, such federal funding of state systems would enhance partici-
pation and accountability. One way the electorate holds both state and federal officials ac-
countable is shifting power to and from state, local, and national levels of government
according to the perceived responsiveness and effectiveness of each level. See infra notes 260-
61 and accompanying text. A constitutional rule that requires any additional national re-
sources to be used to fund state systems and that prohibits national enforcement efforts would
prevent the operation of this important political check. In addition, national enforcement ef-
forts produce a number of efficiencies that national funding of state systems cannot produce.
See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. Compared with exclusive state efforts, concur-
rent national enforcement can improve the overall efficiency of law enforcement efforts and
thereby promote the overriding goal behind participation and accountability: controlling
crime.
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something that is good in itself. One suspects that this premise is less
true in the context of the criminal law. In that context, the electorate
values participation not so much as an end-in-itself, but as a means to its
overriding end of controlling crime. The electoral accountability of pros-
ecutors and legislators gives the electorate a tool it can use to ensure that
these officials respond vigorously to the problem of crime. Of course,
there are other available tools, including that of giving the national gov-
ernment concurrent authority to combat crime. As compared with vest-
ing exclusive authority with the States, the cooperative efforts of the state
and national governments might better control crime and thus better pro-
mote the goal of participation and accountability.
B. RATIONALES FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITY
National authority can sometimes promote uniformity, efficiency,
and liberty.' 59 It also can help avoid a tendency toward under regulation
that results from the relatively parochial perspectives of the separate
States. Proponents of the overfederalization thesis have failed to appre-
ciate the degree to which these various rationales, especially the ten-
dency toward under regulation, favor supplemental national efforts to
control crime. While the States' inclination to under-regulate has been
recognized as a rationale for national authority in the contexts of envi-
ronmental, labor, and corporate law, these implications have not been
explored fully in the context of criminal law.
1. Uniformity
No one argues that there is a general need for a nationally uniform
criminal code. The interstate mobility of offenders and goods, however,
can create a need for nationally uniform regulation in particular areas.' 60
Gun control is a good example. Given the interstate mobility of
people and guns, one state's stringent gun control measure can be sub-
stantially undermined if bordering states choose not to enact such a mea-
sure. If gun control measures are to be their most effective, a nationally
uniform rule is required.
159 See generally SHAPIRo, supra note 88, at 34-57.
160 For discussions about national authority and the need for uniformity in other contexts,
see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987); Brown-Forman Distill-
ers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (holding that Congress possesses exclusive au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce in contexts where a need for uniformity exists); SHA-
Pmo, supra note 88, at 133; Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CoaRNLL L.
REv. 767, 781 (1994).
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2. Efficiency
Compared with state enforcement alone, concurrent state and na-
tional enforcement can produce a number of efficiencies.1 6 1
First, as proponents of the overfederalization thesis have themselves
observed, a national system can be more efficient when a need exists for
interstate coordination. 162 The conventional wisdom is thus willing to
cede the national government authority to investigate a multi state drug
ring, for example. 163 A unified national system of criminal justice can
more easily produce the interstate coordination necessary to such an
investigation.
Second, many proponents of the overfederalization thesis also ac-
knowledge that a national system of enforcement facilitates the develop-
ment and more efficient use of highly specialized resources.' 64 Of
course, the states could conceivably each have prisons for escape artists,
witness protection programs, DNA and computer specialists, and the
like. Yet separately developing and using such specialized resources and
expertise sometimes would involve unnecessary and costly
duplication. 65
Third, the existence of both state and national enforcement systems
facilitates a more cost-effective deployment of criminal punishment.
Sentences under the federal sentencing guidelines tend to be harsher than
those meted out in state systems. 166 This differential allows prosecutors
161 See SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 133 n.74 ("[A]dministration at the national level may
eliminate wasteful overlap and inefficiency."); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19
GA. L. REv. 917, 919 (1985).
162 See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1,
at 23; Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 105; Mengler, supra note 1, at 520. See also
Federal and State Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Crime Subcomm. of the House Judi-
ciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Law Enforcement Hearings], reprinted in FED-
ERAL NEWS SERVICE (May 23, 1996) (testimony of Jane Brady, Attorney General, Delaware);
id. (testimony of John R. Justice, Solicitor, Chester County, South Carolina); id. (testimony of
Jack O'Malley, District Attorney, Cook County, Illinois).
163 See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24.
164 See, e.g., id. at 25; Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 105, 109; Law Enforcement
Hearings, supra note 162 (testimony of Jane Brady, Attorney General, Delaware).
165 In some cases, the national government can and does develop these resources, then
makes them available to the states. But, in at least some cases, developing and deploying such
resources can be easier and more efficient in the context of a comprehensive national enforce-
ment effort that extends from the investigation to the prosecution or even the punishment of
the crime. See Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federali-
zation Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 973 (1995).
166 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 1, at 998 ("The sentences available in a federal prosecution
are generally higher than those available in state court - often ten or even twenty times
higher."); Kevin R. Reitz, The Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 118 (1996). The disparity between federal and state sentences
has led Professor Beale to criticize concurrent state and national jurisdiction because it results
in the unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders. Beale, supra note 1, at 996-1004.
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to channel the high expense of lengthy prison terms selectively to those
cases in which it will produce the greatest expected benefit. 167 For ex-
ample, harsh sentences can produce relatively large benefits when the
case's public notoriety increases general deterrence or when the case in-
volves an incorrigible and dangerous recidivist who needs lengthy inca-
pacitation. Alternatively, the threat of lengthy incarceration may be used
to induce an offender to cooperate.168 Federal and state sentencing dis-
parities thus can be exploited wisely by federal and state prosecutors to
improve the overall effectiveness of crime-fighting.
Fourth, concurrent state and national enforcement schemes facilitate
a useful exchange of ideas and methods.169 As a result of federal diver-
sity of citizenship jurisdiction, the judicial system as a whole benefits
from the dialogue between federal and state courts about the content of
state civil law. State and federal courts similarly can borrow and learn
from each other about the proper interpretation of criminal statutes and
concepts. The mutually beneficial exchange made possible by dual en-
forcement extends beyond the judicial system to policing and punish-
ment systems. National enforcement in a particular area, for instance,
permits the national government to offer training to state police person-
nel in that area.
3. Equal Liberty
Virtually everyone agrees that the national government has a crucial
role to play in protecting the liberties of minorities, particularly racial
minorities. In his famous Federalist No. 10, Madison maintained that
because factions on the state and local level would lose their majority
status in the larger national polity, the national government would better
protect minorities from majoritarian oppression. t70 In modem times, the
focus has been less on Madison's generic factions and more on racial
minorities. The Reconstruction Amendments, accompanying legislation,
and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s were all prompted by the
inability or unwillingness of states to protect African-Americans from
oppression. There is now a broad consensus, one to which the propo-
Among other things, this criticism overlooks a very important efficiency that flows from the
different sentencing schemes.
167 Professors Heymann and Moore note "Local prosecutors now ... ask federal law
enforcement to try street criminals who are regarded as unusually dangerous or elusive." Hey-
mann & Moore, supra note 1, at 110.
168 See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 20, at 1117-25.
169 See Mengler, supra note 1, at 519-20 (identifying "cross-pollination" as a positive
value of cooperative federalism).
170 TIE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 56-65. See also FEDERALIsT No. 51, at
351-53 (James Madison) (James E. Cook ed., 1987) (restating the argument). For critical
discussions of Madison's argument, see SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 79-81; McConnell, supra
note 124, at 1503; Rapaczynski, supra note 128, at 409; Stewart, supra note 161, at 921.
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nents of the overfederalization thesis are party, that the national govern-
ment has a legitimate and important role to play in protecting the liberties
of racial minorities.'71
Although they affirm the national government's role in promoting
racial equality, judges and academics so far have not considered the rela-
tionship between this role and supplemental national authority to combat
street crime. Violent street crime is disproportionately concentrated in
African American neighborhoods. In 1993, for instance, African-Ameri-
cans were victimized by violent crime at a 38% greater rate than the rate
of white Americans. 17 2 Prompted by the reality of statistics such as
these, Professor Randall Kennedy has written: "[T]he principal problem
facing African-Americans in the context of criminal justice today is not
over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws."'173 The national
government's accepted role in promoting racial equality obviously can
justify a national response to racially motivated crimes. Perhaps less ob-
viously, it also furnishes significant support for supplemental national
efforts to combat the violent street crime that disproportionately afflicts
African-American communities.
4. The States' Tendency to Under-regulate
The literature on federalism notes a tendency on the part of the
states to under regulate. This tendency has two basic sources: one flows
from the inclination of each state to overlook the out-of-state benefits of
its regulatory efforts and the other from competition among states for
mobile capital, business, and taxpayers. Although these problems are
well-recognized in the contexts of environmental, labor, and corporate
law, 174 their implications for criminal law have been almost entirely ig-
nored.175 This fact is unfortunate, for these problems do exist in the con-
171 See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 25; Mengler, supra note I, at 526;
Little, supra note 1, at 1059 (noting that critics of federalization do not question the federaliza-
tion of civil rights offenses).
172 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1993 13 (1996). African-Americans experienced violent crime at a rate of 71.7 per thousand,
while the rate among white Americans was 51.7 per thousand.
173 Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1259 (1994) (emphasis in original).
174 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 39-44; Caminker, supra note 157, at 1011-12;
Calabresi, supra note 88, at 781-82; McConnell, supra note 124, at 1495.
175 Although the leading discussions of the federalization of crime recite values of feder-
alism that are thought to favor exclusive state authority, they do not mention the problems of
spillover benefits and race-to-the-bottom effects, and how these problems might lead to subop-
timal state enforcement. See generally LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note I; Beale, supra note 1;
Mengler, supra note 1; Brickey, supra note 1; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1.
A number of different standards have been proposed for delineating the proper boundaries
for national enforcement efforts. See generally supra note 59 and infra note 190. None of
these various standards expressly recognizes as a permissible basis for national criminal juris-
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text of criminal justice and strongly suggest that states tend to devote
insufficient resources to combating crime, especially street crime in
poorer areas.
a. Spillover Benefits
Ideally, government would undertake the expense of additional en-
forcement efforts until the point where marginal cost equals marginal
benefit. Although a wide array of factors can impede realizing this ideal,
a federalism-based impediment is important here.
The impediment arises when, inter alia, a state's regulatory efforts
produce windfall benefits in other states. Due to such spillover benefits
- "positive externalities," in the lexicon of economists 176 - the cost-
benefit ratio the regulating state faces is at odds with the ratio of aggre-
gate benefits and costs. Because the regulating state will enjoy only
some of the benefits of its increased regulatory effort while incurring all
of the costs, it will tend to under regulate. 177
This is precisely the situation states face with respect to the benefits
and costs of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing crime. In today's
highly mobile and pervasively integrated society, a State's enforcement
efforts inevitably produce spillover benefits in other States. While it
does itself reap all of the benefits, the regulating state must bear the en-
tire cost.
External benefits created by enforcing the criminal laws can be eas-
ily identified. Incarcerating an offender in Wisconsin can benefit Illinois
by incapacitating a recidivist who would have committed crimes in Illi-
nois. Similarly, the apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration in Kan-
sas of a drug courier traveling to St. Louis, Missouri would benefit
Kansas to some extent. But, while Kansas would underwrite the entire
cost, Missouri would reap the greatest benefit. A particular state's law
enforcement efforts also produce less direct, but equally real and signifi-
cant, external economic benefits.178 For instance, if successful, a state's
efforts to reduce domestic violence and other violent crime improve the
diction the inadequacy of state resources that result from spillover benefits and race-to-the-
bottom effects. In fact, proponents of the overfederalization thesis have criticized broadly
formulated standards of national jurisdiction precisely because these standards would permit
"the scope of federal jurisdiction [to be based] on the need for federal resources." Beale, supra
note 1, at 1006. See also LONG, RANGE PLAN, supra note I, at 26; Mengler, supra note I, at
523, 534.
176 SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 44 n.109; LeBoeuf, supra note 88, at 567-68.
177 SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 42; LeBoeuf, supra note 88, at 567 ("Activities that gener-
ate positive externalities will be undertaken in suboptimal amounts.").
178 See MILER Er AL., supra note 9 (identifying crime's main economic consequences
and attempting to quantify their value); Cook, supra note 89, at 373 (identifying some of the
crime's economic consequences).
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productivity of workers who produce nationally marketed products,
thereby benefiting consumers and shareholders in other States.17 9
In deciding which level of law enforcement to undertake, a state
will be inclined to ignore such out-of-state benefits. Although a state
will bear and consider the entire cost of a given level of law enforcement,
it will tend not to consider the full benefits that level produces. The
theory of federalism thus predicts that each state will incline toward a
suboptimal level of law enforcement.' 80 Supplemental national authority
is needed.
b. The Race to the Bottom
To maximize their tax base and create jobs, states compete to attract
and retain businesses and affluent citizens. While such competition
sometimes has desirable consequences, it can also trigger a so-called
"race-to-the-bottom"' 81 phenomenon in which state and local govern-
ments forego desirable regulation and taxation.1 2
At first blush, one would think that the race-to-the-bottom effect
would be unlikely to affect crime-fighting efforts.' 83 Skimping on the
enforcement of criminal laws and exacerbating crime seems to subvert
the goal of retaining and attracting mobile business, capital, and taxpay-
ers. The incentives that precipitate the race-to-the-bottom effect in other
179 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 9 (estimating productivity losses that result from
various crimes); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S.15 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 242 (1991) (statement of the National Federation of
Business and Professional Women) ("On a national level, domestic violence has been esti-
mated to cost employers between three to five billion dollars annually due to absenteeism in
the workplace.").
180 The level each state will tend to choose is suboptimal from a national perspective,
which considers aggregate benefits and costs rather than just in-state benefits and costs. That
level also may well be suboptimal from the long-run perspective of most, if not all, states
themselves. Considering each state's decisions in isolation, a state may be better off if it
chooses the level of law enforcement whose marginal in-state cost is equal to the marginal in-
state benefit. But in the long haul most, if not all, states might be better off if all states would
agree to undertake that level of enforcement that is justified by aggregate rather than in-state
benefits and costs. States might try to agree that each will consider aggregate benefits and
costs rather than just in-state benefits. But such agreements are quite unlikely in view of the
transaction costs of their negotiation and enforcement, the hurdles imposed by the Constitu-
tion's Interstate Compact Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the
consent of Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State ...."), and
free rider problems. See SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 39.
181 The phrase was first used in William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Re-
flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 705 (1974).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941); SHAPIRO, supra note 88,
at 42-43; DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 76-77 (1991).
183 See Merritt, supra note 63, at 707 (States can be expected to compete with one another
for students and thus, to ensure safe schools, have an incentive to enact and enforce laws
prohibiting guns in schools).
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contexts, one would think, would compel states to devote sufficient re-
sources to enforcing criminal laws.
This analysis, while superficially persuasive, overlooks two impor-
tant factors. First, much crime, especially violent street crime, is dispro-
portionately concentrated in poor urban areas. According to the most
recent statistics, for instance, "[p]ersons from households with annual
incomes below $7,500 were over twice as likely as those from house-
holds with incomes of $75,000 or more to be violent crime victims" and
"had significantly higher rates of rape/sexual assault and aggravated as-
sault compared to persons in all other income groups .... 84 Second,
the race-to-the-bottom effect is particularly likely to prevent states from
addressing such poverty-related problems. Due to the concentration of
street crime in poor urban areas, efforts to control it necessitate a redistri-
bution of resources. While the costs of such efforts are largely borne by
affluent citizens and businesses through taxation, the benefits are dispro-
portionately centered in poorer communities. As a result of the pressures
of the race-to-the-bottom, "[ilt is generally accepted by economists that
redistributive policies cannot be successfully carried out locally."' 8 5 The
race-to-the-bottom theory, then, predicts that while states will take ample
184 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1993 7 (1996). The same batch of statistics which pertain to 1993 showed that "persons from
households with low incomes experienced higher violent crime victimization rates than per-
sons from wealthier households." Id. In addition, "[residents of cities had the highest violent
crime victimization rates" and "[f]or each specific category of property crimes except bur-
glary, urban households had the highest victimization rates." Id. at 52. See BUREUA OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIMIZATION IN CITY, SUBURBAN, AND
RURAL AREAS 1 (1992) (stating that the average annual rate of violent victimization among
city residents was 92% higher than among rural residents). As Robert McGuire, then Police
Commissioner of the city of New York, wrote, "The cruelest aspect of urban crime is its
devastating and disproportionate impact upon the poor and minority citizens who are the most
vulnerable, emotionally and economically, to the social and personal disruptions of endemic
criminal behavior." Robert J. McGuire, Crine Control in New York: Two Strategies, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 991-92 (1982). See also VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, H.R. REP. No. 103-324 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1803, 1804 ("The impact [of violent crime] is particularly harsh in poorer communities, many
of which are literally being destroyed by violence, while fear of crime deters many neighbors
and businesses from participating in the rebuilding of their communities.").
185 LeBoeuf, supra note 88, at 579. See also SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 134:
[E]ven with respect to a state that is willing to implement some redistribution within
its borders - shifting assets from the wealthier residents to the poorer - I suspect
that the more ambitious such a program, the more likely it is (given the right to exit)
to drive both affluent residents and investment capital to other states.
See also ALICE M. RivLiN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES,
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 122 (1992); McConnell, supra note 124, at 1500 ("[I]t can be
shown that the level of redistribution in a decentralized system is likely to be lower even if
there is virtually unanimous agreement among the citizens that higher levels would be desira-
ble."); Stewart, supra note 161, at 919 ('The mobility of capital and of persons may also deter
state and local governments from providing adequate welfare and social services for the
needy.").
292 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
measures to minimize the incidence of crime in affluent neighborhoods,
they will skimp on such measures in poorer neighborhoods.
Actual practice tends to confirm this hypothesis. The widespread
complaints that poor urban areas are chronically under policed, 86 that
the dockets of state courts are overburdened,187 that state prisons are
under funded and overcrowded,1 88 and that urban areas now receive sub-
stantial federal funding for their criminal justice systems1 89 can be seen
as evidence of the predictable effects of the race-to-the-bottom. Theory
and practice, then, both indicate that, left to their own devices, states
devote insufficient resources to combating crime in poor communities.
C. THE OVERFEDERALIZATION THESIS REVISITED
Proponents of the overfederalization thesis thus have the import of
federalism's values backwards. Instead of favoring exclusive state au-
thority, as the overfederalism thesis asserts, those values in most contexts
overwhelmingly favor a supplemental national role in fighting crime.
Diversity, experimentation, accountability, and liberty may favor
exclusive state authority in other contexts. But in the context of crime-
fighting, their cumulative import favors a concurrent national role. Be-
cause the public's views on most crime, especially violent street crime,
vary little from state to state, the value of diversity furnishes no strong
support for exclusive state authority. As for experimentation, concurrent
state and national authority in most settings does not preclude States
from adopting their own crime-fighting methods. In addition, concurrent
national authority can be seen to better promote the values of liberty,
participation, and experimentation. It expands participation by vesting
both national and subnational officials with responsibility for addressing
the crime problem and by enabling the electorate to hold all such offi-
186 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 173, at 1259; Safety and Security in Public Housing:
Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1994) (testimony of Henry
Cisneros, U. S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development) (noting that gang members
control public housing buildings in Chicago); id. at 128 (testimony of Vincent Lane, Chair-
man, Chicago Housing Authority) (same observation). See also CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTrrrTON 151 (1993):
An especially powerful argument can be made that the criminal law, as currently
administered, does indeed deny equal protection of the laws to both blacks and wo-
men. It does so because blacks do not have the same protection as whites against
criminal violence, and women do not have the same protection as men.
187 See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
188 See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS TO INCARCERATION, Fi-
NAL REPORT 5 (1992) (prepared for Governor of Maryland) ('Today over forty (40) states are
under Federal court orders to reduce prison overcrowding."); COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME,
supra note 90, at 15 ("[M]ore than 120,000 prison beds were needed across the Nation at the
close of 1990.").
189 See infra notes 197, 307.
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cials accountable. By helping to curb crime with the addition of re-
sources and expertise, a concurrent national role can promote liberty and
the overriding objective of experimentation and participation.
The case for permitting national involvement becomes quite com-
pelling when one considers the accepted rationales for national authority.
A concurrent national role in combating crime can produce efficiencies,
promote equality, and redress the tendency of states to deploy an insuffi-
cient level of enforcement resources.
Lopez and the academic and judicial consensus it reflects are thus
wrong in seeking to restrict the national government's jurisdiction to a
relatively narrow list of distinctively federal offenses. 190 Various ratio-
nales for supplemental national authority support expansive national ju-
190 At the extreme, some proponents of the overfederalization thesis seem to advocate
dividing state and national authority over crime into separate, mutually exclusive spheres. See
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24-28; Litman & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 74 (reading
the LONG RANGE PLAN to embrace a "fixed-spheres" view of state and national jurisdiction).
Other proponents would settle for overlapping state and national authority but still would con-
fine concurrent national enforcement efforts to a relatively narrow ambit.
The national government, the proponents argue, should exercise authority over criminal
activity only in the presence of a strong, clearly defined national interest for doing so. See,
e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24-25; Marshall, supra note 1, at 733-36; Miner,
supra note 1, at 126 ("[Flederal prosecution should be limited to misconduct affecting clearly
defined national interests."). The proponents reject arguments that such an interest may be
based on the inadequate funding of state criminal justice systems, Beale, supra note 1, at 1006;
Mengler, supra note 1, at 522-23, the significant impact that the criminal activity exerts on the
national economy, Beale, supra note 1, at 1007; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1249 ("[T]he fact that
deplorable conduct is widespread in the United States, and in that sense constitutes a national
problem, hardly warrants making that conduct a federal crime."), or the symbolic importance
of a national effort that affirms cherished values, Marshall, supra note 1, at 721, 734-36. Such
bases for national intervention are said to be too all-encompassing. Beale, supra note 1, at
982; Marshall, supra note 1, at 734-36.
According to the proponents of the overfederalization thesis, national involvement must
be justified on the basis of a much more limited set of reasons. The proponents commonly
acknowledge that exercising national authority may be necessary and appropriate to address
criminal activity that crosses state borders, such as a multistage or international drug ring. See,
e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note I, at 24; Beale, supra note 1, at 1007; Mengler, supra
note 1, at 526; Miner, supra note 1, at 126. For example, the conventional legal wisdom
would at least cede the national government concurrent jurisdiction over large-scale distribu-
tion of narcotics. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 24; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra
note 1, at 15, 35-38; Miner, supra note I, at 126. Judges and scholars also typically concede
that, because of a local unwillingness to prosecute, a national role may be needed to address
crimes involving civil rights violations or widespread local corruption. See, e.g., LONG RANGE
PLAN, at 25; Mengler, supra note 1, at 526. More controversially, some proponents go further
and accept a national role respecting crimes of an especially sophisticated nature - such as
complex fraud or money laundering offenses - that require specialized law enforcement ex-
pertise. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 25; Mengler, supra note I, at 526. But see Beale,
supra note 1, at 1006-07 (criticizing this proposal). Ordinary street crime, proponents all
agree, clearly fails to satisfy any of these criteria for national intervention. See supra note 2.
Proponents of the overfederalization thesis are right to assert that national criminal juris-
diction should not exist unless there is a need for a national role. But they have taken an
arbitrarily restricted view of when there is such a need.
294 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:247
risdiction. Consider first the efficiency rationale. A need for interstate
coordination, specialized resources, a harsher regime of punishment, or a
dialogue between state and national officials can exist with virtually any
type of offense, including street crimes. Highly trained experts and pros-
ecutors may enhance the successful prosecution of a thief who has com-
mitted this "local" offense through the use of sophisticated computer
techniques. Interstate coordination may be required when investigating a
murderer who has crossed state lines or belongs to a multistage ring.
National jurisdiction over multistage narcotics operations may be aided
significantly by authority to prosecute "local" possession offenses. 191 As
two experienced federal prosecutors have recently written, "Congress
cannot in advance carve out federal jurisdiction over just those cases in
which federal jurisdiction is needed."' 92 Rather than supplying a sound
basis for limiting national enforcement efforts to a discreet list of of-
fenses, concerns about efficiency support selective national involvement
in enforcing a broad array of offenses, including street crimes.
Another main rationale for national authority, which arises from the
tendency of states to underinvest in enforcement, likewise transcends of-
fense categories. When deciding the level of their enforcement activities,
states are inclined to ignore the out-of-state benefits of enforcing of-
fenses of all descriptions. In addition, the pressures of race-to-the-bot-
tom effects impel States to skimp in enforcing even garden-variety state
offenses in poorer neighborhoods. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
then, federalism's values support concurrent national jurisdiction over a
broad array of offenses, not just a select few.
In fact, the justification for supplemental national authority is
strongest respecting violent street crime, a category which federal judges
and academics insist upon treating as outside the province of the national
government. The interest in diversity has exceedingly little weight with
regard to street crime, which the general public tends to view as the
most threatening kind of crime. In addition, because such crime dispro-
portionately afflicts African-Americans, fighting it is one way the na-
tional government can fulfill its role of promoting racial equality.
Finally, States are especially inclined to underinvest in enforcing the
street crime concentrated in poor urban neighborhoods. The problem, of
course, is not that state and local governments do nothing. As theory and
experience both teach, the problem instead is that state and local efforts
191 In some cases, authority over possession offenses may be needed "to 'log-roll' smaller
players ... to produce a case against the main participants." Mengler, supra note I, at 529.
Authority to prosecute possession might also be needed to prosecute a supplier for a lesser
offense due to difficulties of proof and/or to offer attractive plea bargains to major participants.
Id.
192 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 82.
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fall short of the optimum. 1 93 The conventional judicial and academic
wisdom, which views street crime as within the exclusive province of the
States, overlooks these strong justifications for supplemental national en-
forcement efforts. 194
Many proponents of the overfederalization thesis do affirm a gener-
alized need for supplemental national funding of state criminal justice
systems, especially for state courts. 195 But they do not recognize the
degree to which federalism's values support national enforcement efforts
as well. With the exception of diversity, which has a very limited weight
in this context,196 federalism's values do not favor funding over enforce-
ment. Further, a variety of efficiency-related considerations support con-
current national enforcement efforts.
First, national enforcement efforts may be a more efficient way of
tying national intervention to the reasons that justify it. The national
government, it is true, can provide funding to supplement the resources
States devote to, inter alia, combating street crime in poor areas. But the
political pressures that gave rise to the need for national intervention in
the first place raise the strong possibility that an unconditional grant of
funds will not be used in a way that removes the need.' 97 The national
government can require that the funding be used for a particular purpose,
of course. Yet such conditional appropriations and the monitoring neces-
sary to secure compliance with them may well be more intrusive on state
prerogatives than supplemental national enforcement efforts.198 In addi-
tion, national enforcement may be more efficient because it better en-
sures that supplemental resources are used for their intended purposes
while avoiding the costs of monitoring state-by-state compliance.
193 See supra Part III.B.4.
194 See supra note 175.
195 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 26; Mengler, supra note 1, at 522-23, 534.
196 See supra Part III.A.1.
197 In 1968, Congress created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which,
over the next thirteen years, received about $7.5 billion that was disbursed to the states as
block grants. See Robert F. Diegelman, Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control: Les-
sons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 994, 996-1000 (1982). Unfortu-
nately, "too often agencies dissipated the funds by scattering them widely or by applying them
to unwise, frivolous, or routine expenditures, with the result that their potential impact was
sharply diluted." Id. at 1001. See also Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants Act
of 1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-24, 104th Cong. 147 (1995) [hereinafter Block Grants] (discussing
opposing views):
Funds under the LEAA program were thrown away on airplanes that were used for
the private purposes of State officials, Army combat tanks, limousines, radio equip-
ment that didn't work and computers that were left to rot in warehouses, employ-
ment of politicians' friends and relatives, and foolish "consulting" fees.
As a result of the LEAA's perceived failure, the program was discontinued during the Reagan
Administration. Heymann & Moore, supra note I, at 106-07.
198 See infra Part III. D.2.
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Second, absent national enforcement efforts, a national role cannot
produce most of the efficiencies mentioned in the preceding section.
Without federal offenses and a federal system of punishment, offenders
cannot be channeled to and from more and less severe systems of punish-
ment according to the needs of the particular case. The absence of na-
tional enforcement efforts in a particular area of offenses also inhibits a
mutually beneficial exchange of ideas and methods between state and
federal judges, prosecutors, and police. Improved interstate coordination
of law enforcement resources likewise necessitates national enforcement
efforts. Supplemental funding of state systems simply cannot yield these
efficiencies.
Federalism's underlying values, then, furnish little reason for re-
sisting and strong reasons for favoring national enforcement efforts. Of
course, the degree to which national enforcement efforts will make po-
tential efficiencies actual, as well as the ideal mix of national funding and
enforcement, are unclear and subject to debate. But federalism's values
do not categorically favor funding over enforcement and cannot justify a
constitutional prohibition of national enforcement efforts in any area,
particularly the area of street crime. 199
D. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTICULAR FEDERAL LAWS
Lopez and proponents of the overfederalization thesis call into ques-
tion the constitutionality of a series of newly enacted federal offenses.
Relying upon Lopez and the consensus about overfederalization it em-
bodies, some lower courts have struck down a number of these
offenses.200
The lower courts have applied the doctrinal lines that Lopez draws,
focusing on whether the prosecution must show a nexus to interstate
commerce in each case, whether Congress made explicit findings, and
199 Republicans and Democrats in Congress disagree over the wisdom of appropriating
funds to the states for particular uses. The proposed Local Government Law Enforcement
Block Grants Act of 1995, which passed in the House, seeks to amend the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to convert federal funds made available for hiring
additional police officers into block grants "for reducing crime and improving public safety."
Block Grants, supra note 197, at 8. According to Republicans on the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, the block grants enables "localities to respond to their own unique crime problems with
their own solutions." Id. Many of the Democrats on the Committee, however, believe that
such block grants "eliminate any standards to which local officials will be held" and "will
result at the end of five years in billions of dollars being thrown down a rat-hole, with no
evidence of what they were used for and whether any results were obtained." Id. at 147. As
yet another alternative, Congress could channel the funds into federal law enforcement.
We do not believe that the Constitution dictates the outcome of this choice among loosely
conditioned block grants, appropriations for particular uses, and federal enforcement. The
choice is instead political.
200 See generally supra note 4.
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whether the offense regulates "commercial" activity. 201 We cannot begin
to fathom why such superficial and formalistic factors should determine
the outcome of the modem conflict between the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment. The first two factors - whether the statute re-
quires a case-by-case jurisdictional nexus with interstate commerce and
whether Congress made findings to this effect - are devoid of meaning-
ful content. A nexus with interstate commerce can be shown in every
case 202 and Congress always can make the requisite findings.203 As for
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity, the dis-
tinction might well lack any principled definition. 204 But even if this
distinction does have real meaning, it overlooks Congress's authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach "noncommercial" activ-
ity that substantially impedes interstate commerce.205
201 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell,
70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995).
202 As Professor Nagel has observed:
[A]ny conceivable object of regulation will necessarily involve something that has
traveled in interstate commerce. Everyone knows that schools, police departments,
and families all purchase goods that have been part of commerce. Therefore, the
much-heralded jurisdictional tie is itself subject to the logic of Lopez - that is, the
asserted tie to commerce would potentially allow national regulation of every imagi-
nable activity.
Nagel, supra note 88, at 648. Thus, Congress can always insert a jurisdictional element that
does nothing to narrow a statute's breadth. For example, if the Gun-Free School Zones Act
had required a showing that the gun or its component parts had moved across state lines, it still
would have covered all guns possessed in or near schools. Legislation along this line has
already been introduced. Proposed Legislation: 'The Gun-Free School Zones Amendments
Act of 1995," H.R. Doc. No. 72, 104th Cong. (1995); Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995, S.
890, 104th Cong. (1995).
203 In today's economy, Congress can always find that the class of regulated activity has a
substantial and adverse impact on the national economy. See supra notes 61, 84-94, and ac-
companying text. In Lopez, for instance, Justice Breyer's dissent made this requisite showing,
which the Court did not seriously contest. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. See
also Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading
of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 757, 774 (1996) ("Not only did Justice
Breyer do Congress' work, he did it well."). In fact, Congress already had amended the ver-
sion of the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez to include findings about the impact
of gun possession in and near schools on interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994).
See also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4 (noting that "[t]he Government does not rely upon these
subsequent findings as a substitute for the absence of findings in the first instance").
204 For a nice discussion of the various problems, see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-64
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority itself observed that "depending on the level of general-
ity, any activity can be looked upon as commercial." Id. at 1633. See also Nagel, supra note
88, at 648.
205 See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. See also Nagel, supra note 88, at 647
("[I]t is logically possible - even as a practical matter highly likely - that such everyday
matters as the quality of family life (or public schooling) do affect productivity.").
A distinction between "commercial" and "noncommercial" activities also finds no sup-
port in federalism's values. There is no necessary correlation between the net import of feder-
alism's various rationales, on the one hand, and the "commercial" nature of the activity, on the
other.
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Courts can resolve the conflict between the Tenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause in a way that is both more rational and more faith-
ful to the Constitution by focusing instead on the relationship between a
particular federal offense and federalism's underlying values. If this
Part's analysis is so far correct, it should be possible to see recently en-
acted federal offenses as fully consistent with federalism's underlying
values. This is, in fact, the case.
1. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, Caracking, Gang-Related
Violence, and Violent Street Crime Generally
In Lopez, the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act,20 6 which criminalized possession of guns in and around schools.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's decision and much of the scholarly re-
action to it,207 the values of federalism amply justify concurrent national
efforts to combat this problem and other forms of street crime as well.
The requirement of exclusive state authority which Lopez imposes
cannot be derived from the values of diversity, experimentation, partici-
pation, and liberty. As for diversity, public opinion does not vary from
State to State about whether guns should be permitted in and around
schools. The intensity and homogeneity of the public sentiment is indi-
cated by the 43 state laws that target this very problem. 20 8 The federal
statute did not preclude states from experimenting with other ways of
Education furnishes a good example. Although Lopez seems to place education in the
category of noncommercial activity, 115 S. Ct. at 1632, 1633, federalism's values furnish
strong support for some national role. First, the interstate mobility of students and graduates
produces a need for uniformity. In law and medicine, for instance, measures of educational
achievement, educational standards, and tests for admission are substantially uniform nation-
wide. Second, the redistributive rationale for national authority has some application. The
problems of positive externalities and the race-to-the-bottom suggest that States will not
devote sufficient resources to education, especially respecting the poor. See SHAPIRO, supra
note 88, at 42 ("[T]he Nation's total commitment to education, if left wholly to the states as
individual polities, may well be suboptimal."). The large inequities in school financing that
exist in many States, see, e.g., Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139
(Tenn. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), tend to
confirm this hypothesis. To the extent that an optimal level of investment in education and
equal educational opportunity are important to a productive national economy, some national
involvement may be necessary. A formalistic doctrinal rule that would treat education as non-
commercial would ignore these rationales for national authority.
206 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990).
207 Much of the scholarly writing about Lopez makes the strong (and, in our view, untena-
ble) claim that federalism's underlying values furnish considerable support for exclusive state
authority and essentially no support for a concurrent national role. See Friedman, supra note
203, at 767 n.58; Regan, supra note 93, at 569; Merritt, supra note 63, at 707; Calabresi, supra
note 88, at 802-03.
208 Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al., United States v. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (appendix). See also 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[O]ver
40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school
grounds.").
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addressing the problem with their own laws. 20 9 By making both federal
and state officials responsible for the problem, concurrent national in-
volvement would seem to promote participation and accountability. 210
By expanding the resources available to address the problem and improv-
ing enforcement, a concurrent national role would also seem to promote
liberty and the goals underlying experimentation and accountability. 211
If anything, the values typically associated with state authority tend to
favor, not undercut, concurrent national jurisdiction.
In addition, several of the values typically associated with national
authority combine to provide strong support for a concurrent national
role. Good reasons exist for doubting the adequacy of state law enforce-
ment. The problem of guns and gun-related violence in the schools is
most acute in poor urban areas. 212 Race to the bottom pressures and past
experience indicate that states will not undertake the redistribution of
resources needed for sufficient enforcement. 213 In addition, any given
state will be inclined to ignore the intangible but real benefits that en-
forcement efforts produce in other states.214
Other rationales for national authority are also implicated. Given
that gun-related violence has a disproportionate impact on schools in Af-
rican-American communities,215 the Gun-Free School Zones Act can be
seen to flow, in part, from the national government's accepted role of
promoting racial equality. Considerations of efficiency also support a
concurrent national role. In particular cases, interstate coordination or
the harsher penalties of the federal sentencing guidelines may be needed.
All told, federalism's values favor concurrent national enforcement by a
lopsided margin.
A similar analysis applies with respect to street crime generally, in-
cluding recently enacted statutes that give the national government con-
current enforcement jurisdiction over carjacking 216 and some forms of
209 See supra Part III.A.2.
210 See supra Part III.A.4.
211 See supra Part III.A.3.
212 UNITED STATES DE'r. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SCHOOL CRIME: A
NATIONAL VICTIMIZATION StRvEY 1 (1991). See supra note 184 and accompanying text (not-
ing that the poor experience more violent crime). See also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VicrMis: A NATIONAL REPORT 55 (1995) [hereinafter JUVENILE OFFENDERS]
(noting that "[t]wenty-five percent of students in central cities reported gangs in their schools,
compared with 8% in non-metropolitan areas" and that "the students who reported gangs in
their schools were also more likely than other students to be the victims of crime").
213 See supra Part III.B.4.b.
214 For a discussion of those benefits, see 115 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
also supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
215 In 1991, "[b]lack juveniles had a violent victimization rate 20% higher than that of
white juveniles." JUVENILE OFFENDERS, supra note 212, at 22. 'Twenty-three percent of vio-
lent juvenile victimizations occurred in school or on school property in 1991." Id.
216 18 U.S.C. § 2119:
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gang-related violence.217 We therefore disagree with those federal
judges who have declared the carjacking statute unconstitutional21 8 and
with those scholars who condemn the statute as unwise, if not
unconstitutional. 219
2. Megan's Law
Megan's law, enacted this past legislative session, requires that
states establish systems for notifying communities that a convicted sex
offender intends to locate there upon release from prison.220 Because
states must observe the requirement as a condition of receiving federal
funds, the law involves a conditional exercise of Congress's spending
power. In the end, we believe that Megan's law strikes a defensible bal-
ance among federalism's underlying values. The question, however, is a
closer one because conditional spending is more dangerous to federal-
ism's values than concurrent national enforcement efforts.
We begin by noting a perversity in the current legal thinking about
conditional exercises of the spending power. Under present doctrine, a
law that requires states to comply with conditions attached to federal
funds is looked upon more indulgently than a law authorizing concurrent
national enforcement efforts.221 From the perspective of federalism's
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or at-
tempts to do so, shall [be guilty of a crime].
217 18 U.S.C. § 36 (drive-by shootings).
218 United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting); United
States v. Mallory, 884 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The great majority of courts, including
every appellate court that has addressed the issue, has upheld the constitutionality of the
carjacking provision. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. McHenry, supra; United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
appellate decisions); United States v. Lowe, 924 F. Supp. 318 (1996).
219 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 24-25; Brickey, supra note 1, at 1162 n.154.
220 Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345. The law was enacted "in response to public
outcry following the brutal rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl, Megan Kanka. Megan,
her parents, and the community did not know that the murderer, who lived across the street
from the Kankas, was a twice-convicted sex offender." Artway v. Attorney General of State of
New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1996) (discussing the New Jersey version of the
statute).
221 In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court held that Congress's power to spend is
limited only by the requirement that the spending be in the general welfare and is broader than
Congress's power to regulate, which is limited by Congress's enumerated powers. 297 U.S. I
(1936). The Court has given Congress very broad authority to attach conditions to funds it
makes available to the states. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); TRIBE, supra
note 61 § 5-10, at 321-23 (1988).
In reviving federalism-based limits on national power, the Rehnquist Court has also
treated Congress's spending power as broader than its power to regulate under the commerce
clause. In New York v. United States, for instance, the Court held that, while Congress had
exceeded its regulatory power in enacting the take title provisions of the Low-Level Radioac-
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values, however, conditional federal spending is much harder to justify'
than concurrent federal enforcement.
As compared with conditional spending, concurrent national en-
forcement efforts better preserve the values of diversity, experimentation,
and participation. Federal law applies only in the relatively small per-
centage of cases in which the national government actually exercises its
concurrent authority. States remain free to handle their own enforcement
efforts as they see fit, according to their own law. To the extent that
public opinion varies and state laws differ accordingly, such diversity can
be given considerable effect. Because states continue to enforce their
own laws respecting the problem, concurrent national enforcement ef-
forts also permit substantial state experimentation. In addition, state offi-
cials can be held accountable for the content and enforcement of state
laws.
In contrast, conditions imposed through the spending power induce
states to conform to nationally uniform rules. While concurrent national
enforcement efforts permit the bulk of cases to be handled under varying
state laws, a condition attached to federal spending applies in all cases.
For this reason, conditional exercises of the spending power such as
Megan's law should satisfy a higher, not lower, burden.
Megan's law probably can surmount such a burden. Rather than
applying only in a small percentage of cases in which the national gov-
ernment chooses to exercise enforcement authority, Megan's law envi-
sions a nationally uniform rule. It therefore would be problematic if
opinions about the problem at hand were diversely distributed among the
states. However, "[a]t least 46 states have enacted laws requiring con-
victed sex offenders to register with law enforcement authorities" and
"[m]any of these statutes also provide for public notification of the pres-
ence of registered sex offenders in local communities. '222 The apparent
uniformity of public sentiment indicates that the interest in diversity has
no strong application here.
In addition, the problem of externalities supplies a persuasive justi-
fication for national authority. Given the interstate mobility of released
sex offenders, any state's notification requirement can impose very sig-
nificant costs on other states. To avoid one state's notification require-
ment, an offender can relocate in a state that does not have such a
requirement. Indeed, a state might enact a notification requirement
partly because it tends to shift the problems associated with released sex
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, it could achieve the same regulatory goal through
a conditional exercise of its spending power. 505 U.S. 144, 186-88 (1992).
222 Doe v. Pataka, 919 F. Supp. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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offenders elsewhere. 223 Given that one state's decision imposes signifi-
cant negative externalities on other states, national authority makes
sense.
3. Church-Burning and Domestic Violence
In response to the recent rash of church-burnings, Congress enacted
the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, which expands the national
government's jurisdiction over racially motivated church-burnings. 224 A
number of the rationales for national authority support this statute. The
most obvious and important is the national government's longstanding
and accepted role in promoting racial equality. This role, which finds
constitutional recognition in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
justifies supplemental national enforcement efforts respecting racially
motivated crimes, including church-burnings. 225 The efficiency rationale
for concurrent national enforcement also may have some application. A
few observers have speculated that the recent church-burnings may in-
volve a concerted conspiracy involving organizations that are dedicated
to promoting interracial antagonism. Should this speculation prove true,
the national government's greater efficiency in addressing problems that
require interstate cooperation would support a supplemental national role
as well.
The rationales commonly advanced in support of exclusive state au-
thority do not militate against concurrent national enforcement efforts
here. It is true that public opinion about racial equality has been and
perhaps still is diversely distributed along geographic lines. The Four-
teenth Amendment, however, makes it illegitimate for governments to
effectuate these preferences against racial equality. In addition, concur-
223 One might surmise that each state would seek to avoid such externalities by enacting
its own notification requirement and that States would eventually achieve the same result as
Megan's law: a nationally uniform notification requirement. This prospect, however, does not
argue persuasively against national authority. Given the widespread support for a notification
requirement, there is little reason to desire that states to do it alone. In addition, promulgating
a national notification requirement would be easier than the halting and time-consuming pro-
cess of state-by-state adoption. It would also avoid the externality problem of sex offenders
moving to states that do not have notification requirements. If the matter is left to the states,
some states will experience such external costs until all states adopt the notification
requirements.
224 Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (1996). For an explanation of the changes the
Act makes in the law, see CHURCH ARSON PREVENTION ACT OF 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-621
(1996).
225 We think that federal jurisdiction over race-hate crimes may be grounded on Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority. Such jurisdiction also may be grounded on Congress's
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, depending on whether that section
enables Congress to regulate the behavior of private rather than governmental actors, see
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 774-86 (1966), and under Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
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rent national enforcement permits substantial state experimentation and
promotes participation and liberty. 226
Similar considerations apply with respect to the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, a favorite target of those who subscribe to the
overfederalization thesis.227 The Act gives the national government con-
current authority over domestic abusers who cross state lines with the
intent to commit abuse or violate a protective order.2 -8 As in the case of
the Church Arson Prevention Act, the national government's role in pro-
moting equality can be seen to favor a supplemental national role. 2 9 For
example, ample evidence exists that crimes of domestic violence against
women are underenforced at the state and local levels.230 Furthermore,
such crimes disproportionately affect the poor.231 This fact reinforces
the need for a supplemental national role.
As with other offenses, the national government's greater efficiency
in investigating and prosecuting interstate crimes sometimes comes into
play, particularly since the Act requires interstate movement as a prereq-
uisite to jurisdiction.232 We therefore disagree with the widespread judi-
cial and scholarly criticism of the Violence Against Women Act as well
as with a recent district court decision that invalidated the Act's civil
226 See supra Part III.A.2-4.
227 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 1, at 995; William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks:
National Conference on State-Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1660 (1992); Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, in THE
THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (Jan. 1992) ("The broad definition of criminal conduct.. . could involve
the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes."); William H. Rehnquist,
Judicial Conference Opposes Expanded Role for Federal Courts, in THE TIRD BRANCH 1, 3
(Oct. 1991) (reporting that the U.S. Judicial Conference voted to oppose the criminal provi-
sions in the Violence Against Women Act); Brickey, supra note 1, at 1167-69 (characterizing
the Act as "an overt attempt to substitute the judgment of Congress for those of state legisla-
tures and courts on a matter peculiarly within the domain of the states"); Naomi R. Cahn,
Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. REV. 1073, 1110 n.191 (1994)
(noting that, although the Judicial Conference voted in 1993 to take no position on the Act, it
reiterated its concerns about federalization).
228 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (1994).
229 See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1882-83
(1995).
230 See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT op 1993, S. REP. No. 103-138, at 27-28, 41-42
(1993).
231 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1993 39 (1996). In 1993, people whose annual household income was less than $7,500 were
victims of violent crimes at the hands of relatives at a rate of 12 per thousand. The rate
declined as household income increased. People whose annual household income was $75,000
or more experienced such crimes at a rate of 2.3 per thousand - approximately 20% of the
rate experienced in the poorest families. Id.
232 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 4 ("The drafters of the interstate domestic violence
statute had legitimate concerns; namely, that evidence might be difficult to obtain in domestic
violence cases involving offenses committed in more than one state.").
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cause of action with reasoning that applies equally to the Act's criminal
provisions. 233
4. Child Support
Federalism's values also furnish strong support for the Child Sup-
port Recovery Act of 1992,234 which criminalizes a willful failure "to
pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in
another State .... ,135 First, the problem of externalities 236 justifies a
concurrent national role. When the child and the noncustodial parent
who owes support are located in different states, as the Act requires, that
parent's state will incur much, if not all, of the cost of enforcement while
the benefits will accrue in another state. The theory of federalism
predicts that the efforts of noncustodial the parent's state to collect from
the parent will be suboptimal. Consistent with this prediction, "the sta-
tistics suggest the chances for successful avoidance of [child support]
obligations [increase] significantly when there is a state boundary be-
tween the child and the non-custodial parent. '237
Second, the Act finds strong support in the national government's
greater efficiency in investigating and prosecuting interstate crimes. The
national government possesses jurisdiction only when the child and par-
ent reside in different States, therefore providing the case with an inter-
state dimension.238 Third, none of the rationales for exclusive authority
apply in this context. 239 The strong public support for holding deadbeat
233 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10766
(July 26, 1996) (addressing the constitutionality of civil cause of action created by the Act).
But see Doe v. Doe, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8601 (June 19, 1996) (upholding civil cause of
action created by Act).
The Act's criminal provisions have been so far used in only a handful of cases. See
generally Abramovsky, supra note 1. So far, there are no published opinions addressing their
constitutionality.
234 18 U.S.C. § 228.
235 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1992). The general problem of unpaid child support is of enor-
mous significance. "[O]f the $48 billion in child support payments owed nationally according
to court judgments, a total of $35 billion has never been collected." United States v. Sage, 906
F. Supp. 84, 90 (D. Conn. 1995).
236 See supra Part I1I.B.4.a.
237 Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90. See also CHILD SuPPoRT RECOVERY Acr OF 1992, H.R.
REP. No. 102-771, at 5 (1992) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY AcT].
238 See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 165, at 974 ("[A] relatively small number of egre-
gious offenders ... intentionally exploit states' jurisdictional limitations to elude their child
support responsibilities."); Renee M. Landers, Federalization of State Law: Enhancing Op-
portunities for Three-Branch and Federal-State Cooperation, 46 HASTINGs LJ. 811, 819
(1995) (national government has a "superior... capacity to locate and track parents and to
identify employers of non-paying parents").
239 According to the House Report accompanying the Act, "at least 42 states have made
willful failure to pay child support a crime .... CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY Acr, supra note
237, at 5-6. Furthermore, the Act does not displace differing state rules concerning the setting
and modification of support awards. It is a means of enforcing, not supplanting, such rules.
1997] CRIME
dads responsible does not vary significantly from state to state. Thus,
interest in diversity has no real application.
Unfortunately, basing their decisions on a broad reading of the for-
malistic factors Lopez identifies as relevant, several district courts have
invalidated the Act.240 From the standpoint of federalism's values, how-
ever, this result is not only wrong, but indefensible.24'
5. The Brady Law and Gun Control
In 1993, the President signed the Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act into law.242 The Brady Act uses the criminal law to regulate the
sale of handguns. To improve the efficacy of the Gun Control Act of
1968, which prohibits the transfer of firearms to people such as felons
and fugitives from justice, the Brady Act mandates a five day waiting
period for purchase of handguns. During that period, it requires a local
See 18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(1) (1992). As Professor Dailey has observed, "[b]ecause the federal
law induces the states to take responsibility for child support standards and enforcement, it can
be viewed as reinforcing rather than undermining state authority." See Dailey, supra note 229,
at 1885. The interest in diversity thus has no real application here.
240 United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4033 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995);
United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz), reconsideration denied, 912 F. Supp.
1248 (1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Rebecca A. Wistner, Comment,
Abusing the Power to Regulate: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992,46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 935 (1996) (arguing that, although constitutional under Lopez, the Act represents an
abuse of federal power as a matter of policy).
Other district courts have upheld the Act's constitutionality. See United States v. Gana-
poski, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9353 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 1996) (citing cases). As of this writing,
every federal appellate court that has addressed the issue has upheld the Act's constitutionality.
See, e.g., United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hamp-
shire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Parker, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4033 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sage, 92
F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996).
241 One might try to defend the conclusion on the ground that the Act usurps the tradi-
tional role of States over matters of family law. The Lopez Court, for instance, mentioned
family law along with education and criminal law enforcement as areas that, by tradition, are
local in nature. 115 S. Ct. at 1632, 1633. See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 729 (reasoning that the
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction indicates the Child Support Re-
covery Act's unconstitutionality).
Such a use of tradition, however, would be quite arbitrary. There is a competing tradition
of national authority over lawbreakers whose illegal action crosses state lines. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 2312, 2313 (transportation, sale of stolen motor vehicles that have crossed state
lines); 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (transporting a kidnaping victim across state lines). Deadbeat dads
who willfully defy orders to support children located in other States fit within this tradition of
national authority. As in other contexts, conflicting traditions exist and reliance upon tradition
is unprincipled and result-oriented. See supra Part II.B.
242 The legislation's formal title is the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993
and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1993).
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law enforcement officer243 to make a reasonable effort to check the pro-
spective purchaser's background. Lower courts are divided over whether
the local officer's duties violate the limits that, under New York v. United
States,244 the Tenth Amendment imposes on Congress's authority to re-
quire the participation of state officials in federal regulatory programs. 245
The Supreme Court has agreed to resolve this controversy in its coming
1996 term.246
In addition, lower courts have begun to address more general consti-
tutional challenges to other federal firearm offenses. 247 In contrast with
most other crime-fighting contexts, diversity does furnish significant
support for exclusive state regulatory authority over the purchase of fire-
arms. Public opinion does not differ significantly from state to state over
the wisdom of notifying communities about the presence of released sex
offenders or of eliminating gang violence, carjacking, and the presence of
guns in schools. But public opinion does differ over the wisdom of regu-
lating the purchase of firearms with stringent regulation, finding signifi-
cantly greater support in New York than in Texas, for example.
The rationale of experimentation also furnishes more support for
exclusive state authority over the purchase of firearms than it does in
most other crime-fighting contexts. Concurrent national jurisdiction over
a particular criminal activity, such as carjacking or guns in schools,
leaves states free to experiment with other means of preventing and pun-
ishing the activity and precludes states only from making the activity
legal. In the contexts previously discussed, states do not wish to experi-
ment by legitimizing the activity. In contrast, some states do wish to
make the immediate and unregulated purchase of firearms legal. The
Brady law, however, precludes state experimentation with this
alternative.
Still, while some of federalism's values favor exclusive state author-
ity over firearm purchases, an interest in regulatory uniformity furnishes
impressive support for national intervention. When one or more states
decide to regulate such purchases, a contrary decision by nearby states
has the external effect of substantially undermining the regulation. In-
stead of complying with one state's regulatory requirements, sellers and/
243 The Act requires that the background check be conducted by the local Chief Law
Enforcement Officer, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(I)(III)-(IV) (1993), who may be the local chief
of police, sheriff, or his equivalent or designee, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8) (1993).
244 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
245 See, e.g., Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding portion of the
Act unconstitutional). But see Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding
constitutionality of Act); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996) (same holding).
246 Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
247 See infra note 252.
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or purchasers can simply travel to other states that do not have such re-
quirements. Indeed, the ease of circumventing the gun control laws of
any particular state or locality provides a potent and often successful ar-
gument against adopting such laws. The ability of one grdup of states to
undermine the regulatory preferences of another group of states furnishes
a strong justification for vesting the national government with decision-
making authority. If gun regulation is to be the most effective, it must be
done on the national level.
Federalism's values stand in conflict not only respecting the regula-
tion of firearm purchases, but also respecting a narrower issue: the con-
stitutionality of the local sheriff's role in enforcing the Brady Act.
Because the Act does not provide funding for the required background
checks, it consumes resources that state and local governments may wish
to use for other purposes.248 To the extent it forces such a rearrangement
of fiscal priorities, the Act undermines the values promoted by state and
local authority, such as diversity. Congress's ability to make states
shoulder the cost of complying with the background check requirement
also can be seen to have given Congress an undue incentive to enact the
requirement. On the other hand, the value of efficiency favors using
local officials, which avoids "a costly, intrusive, and substantially dupli-
cative [national] administrative bureaucracy .. . ."249 The use of local
officials to enforce national laws can even promote diversity by "en-
hanc[ing] the prospect that ministerial enforcement decisions will reflect
local conditions and concerns .... -25o In addition, because "the total
implementation cost is relatively low . . . [an] unfunded mandate [is]
reasonable, since federal reimbursement would itself entail potentially
substantial transaction costs which represent deadweight social
losses." 251
In contrast with other contexts, then, federalism's values give rise to
weighty arguments both for and against the Brady Act and perhaps some
other national gun control measures as well. 25 2 -In this light, the constitu-
248 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part); Caminker, supra note 157, at 1079-80; H. Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question in Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 685-87 (1993).
249 Caminker, supra note 157, at 1014.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 1084.
252 Federalism's values stand in conflict only when public preferences about the activity
in question differ significantly from state to state. Where public preferences do not so differ,
the interest in diversity is not implicated and federalism's values unequivocally support con-
current national authority.
In contrast with the Brady Act, which regulates the general sale of firearms, public prefer-
ences probably are not diversely distributed respecting the activities most federal firearms
offenses regulate. For instance, we seriously doubt that public preferences differ significantly
from state to state over whether convicted felons should be allowed to possess a firearm, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1993); whether gun dealers should be allowed to sell firearms to known drug
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tionality of such gun control measures depends on the net import of fed-
eralism's conflicting values and on who has authority to determine the
appropriate balance: the Justices or the electorate.
E. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
In most contexts, including that of street crime, federalism's values
decisively favor concurrent national enforcement efforts. While little
that is plausible can be said in favor of exclusive state authority, effi-
ciency concerns and the tendency of states to deploy insufficient enforce-
ment resources argue strongly for a concurrent national role. This fact
alone demonstrates the unsoundness of the result in Lopez and the gen-
eral constitutional claims of the overfederalization thesis. Yet Lopez and
the overfederalization thesis become even more untenable when one con-
siders the deference that the Court properly owes to the national political
process over matters of federalism. That deference, in fact, implies the
constitutionality of even the Brady Act, which, from the perspective of
federalism's underlying rationales, is a much closer case.
Three primary considerations justify giving Congress wide latitude
to determine the net import of federalism's underlying values. The first,
and perhaps the most important, is that federalism works by empowering
political majorities, who are well represented in the national political
process and who are better able than the federal judiciary to identify their
own interests. In contrast with constitutional civil liberties, which seek
to protect political and religious dissidents from electoral majorities, fed-
eralism empowers such majorities, sometimes at the state and national
level. 253 Although the Justices and scholars frequently speak as though
federalism protects the interests of state governments, 254 it would be a
addicts, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1993); whether people should be allowed to possess or sell fire-
arms whose serial number has been erased, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1993); and whether people
should be allowed to possess machine guns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1993). From the standpoint
of federalism's values, then, courts have reached the correct result in upholding the constitu-
tionality of these provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996)
(18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1993)); United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1031 (2d Cir.
1996) (18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1993)); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995) (18
U.S.C. § 922(o) (1993)). But see United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 798 (Jones, J., dissenting)
(arguing that prohibiting possession of machine guns is unconstitutional).
Public preferences possibly do differ significantly from state to state over the wisdom
banning assault weapons. 18 U.S.C. § 922(w) (1993). Still, polls indicate that nationwide, the
support for the ban is quite high. See WALL ST. J., June 9, 1995, at Al (reporting Wall St.
Journal/NBC poll finding that public favors assault weapon ban by 78% to 18%).
253 See Blumstein, supra note 5, at 1260.
254 In debating whether the Court should defer to the national political process on matters
of federalism, for instance, the Justices and commentators have focused on the adequacy with
which state governments are represented in the national political process. See, e.g., Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) (majority opinion); id. at 565-66
(Powell, J., dissenting); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
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fundamental mistake to see federalism as protecting the interests of gov-
ernmental entities.25 5 In our constitutional system, it is the people, and
not the state or national governments, who have ultimate sovereignty. 256
Indeed, the central aim of the Republican Guarantee Clause257 is to re-
quire that each state government remain accountable to electoral majori-
ties. 258 Because the electoral majorities whom federalism empowers are
well-represented in the national political process, 259 the outcome of that
process would seem to constitute a reliable indication of the interests of
those majorities. Judicial review in the name of federalism does not
properly respect the competence of those majorities to determine their
own interests.
A second reason also supports deferring to the national political pro-
cess: Judicial intervention frustrates one of the political checks through
which the electorate furthers its view of good government and, with it,
federalism's underlying values. In Federalist No. 46, Madison empha-
sized that the electorate can avoid and discourage oppressive and ineffi-
cient government by shifting authority back and forth between the
national and state governments. 260 Such vertical power-shifting requires
crss: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171-259
(1980); Merritt, supra note 61, at 1566-70.
255 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("The Constitution does not
protect the sovereignty of the States for the benefit of the States or state governments as
abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of public officials governing the States.").
256 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. preamble. ("We the People of the United States... do ordain
and establish this Constitution ...."); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 145-46 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (James E. Cooke ed., 1987); THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 234 (James Madison) (James E.
Cooke ed., 1987); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181.
257 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them from Invasion; and, on Application of the Legisla-
ture, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Vio-
lence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
258 Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 23 (1988) (suggesting that a republican government "is
one in which the people control their rulers" and citing, inter alia, the Federalist Papers).
259 Electoral majorities at the state level, or subdivisions of such state majorities, elect
each of the 435 members of the House of Representatives. Electoral majorities at the state
level are represented equally in the Senate. In combination, state majorities elect the President
through the popular vote and through the electoral college.
260 Madison began by stressing that ultimate sovereignty rests with the people and that the
legitimacy of both state governments and the national government springs from this source.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 315 (James Madison). He then declared that if the
people come to favor the national government over state governments, they "ought not surely
to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it most due
. ...." Id. at 317. He thought it highly likely that the People would remain partial to state
government "because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature
of things, be advantageously administered." Id. Nonetheless, Madison thought that the people
ought to be free to follow their judgment regarding the "proofs of a better administration...
Id.
For a discussion of Madison's argument, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION 302-
03 (1993).
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concurrent state and national authority for its operation. Judicially-en-
forced zones of exclusive state authority, however, preclude the opera-
tion of this political check, which Madison thought central to liberty and
efficiency and which has had considerable practical significance through-
out the nation's history.26'
A third reason for giving Congress wide latitude is that balancing
federalism's values involves judgments that are best left to the political
process. The net import of federalism's sometimes conflicting values,
the proper mix of state and national authority, and the proper balance
between federal funding and enforcement efforts cannot be assessed by
abstract, a priori speculations. The answers depend largely on contesta-
ble judgments of policy and prediction which then must be re-evaluated
in light of experience.262 The evolving and revisable nature of such
judgments is ill-suited to judicially-enforced constitutional rules, which
inhibit the required flexibility. 263 Especially because the purpose of such
judgments is to further the interests of the electoral majorities, these
judgments are better left to the trial and error of the political process.
In light of these three reasons, the Court can justify invalidating
national crime-fighting efforts only when federalism's underlying values
plainly favor exclusive state authority. So far, the concurrent national
crime-fighting efforts do not fall into this category. Even when federal-
ism's values point sharply in different directions, as they do respecting
261 The New Deal, President Johnson's Great Society, and the 1994 congressional elec-
tions all furnish important historical examples of power-shifting to and from the national and
state governments. The shifting of power from the national government to the states was a
prominent theme of the 1994 congressional elections that resulted in a Republican Congress.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 721. Proponents of such a power shift seek to revise, if not reverse,
the last sea change in nation-state relations - the enactment of President Johnson's Great
Society programs in the 1960s. The welfare, Medicaid, and Medicare programs of the Great
Society transferred much responsibility for the health and welfare of the poor and elderly to
the national government because of the perceived unresponsiveness of the States. See RiVLIN,
supra note 185, at 92.
262 See SHAPIRO, supra note 88, at 119 ("[U]nfortunately, clear answers, even if ascertain-
able in light of present conditions, are not immutable but rather are necessarily contingent on
time and place. What may seem most appropriate today may seem foolishly out of tune with
tomorrow's needs.").
263 The balancing of federalism's values in any given context necessitates empirical judg-
ments about, inter alia, the degree to which concurrent national efforts will produce efficien-
cies and the strength of the pressures of the race-to-the-bottom. In the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Justices have explicitly affirmed that the decision of such
debatable empirical questions should be left to the political process. Justice Brennan, who is
perhaps the most "liberal" modern Justice, and Justice Scalia, who was one of the most "con-
servative," agreed on this point. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
679 (1981) (Brennan and Marshall, Js., concurring) (one of the most basic dormant Commerce
Clause principles is that "[tihe courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judg-
ments of lawmakers"); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[I] do not know what qualifies us" to determine "how effective the present
statute is in achieving one or the other objective .... ).
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some national gun control measures, Congress, not the Court, should
have the ultimate authority to determine their net import.
F. OVERVIEW
The Court has very little justification, especially in the context of
street crime, for invoking constitutional federalism to invalidate concur-
rent national efforts to enforce the criminal laws. Neither the Constitu-
tional nor societal tradition can furnish a defensible basis for the judicial
imposition of federalism-based limits on national crime-fighting. The
Constitution embraces principles that now conflict with each other, and
using tradition is inherently unprincipled and illegitimate. In contrast,
the values behind federalism do furnish a sound basis on which to deter-
mine the Constitution's allocation of state and national authority. Yet,
contrary to the conventional wisdom among judges and scholars, those
values overwhelmingly support concurrent national efforts to combat
crime, particularly street crime. Even when federalism's values support
good arguments both for and against a concurrent national role - as
they do in the case of the Brady Act - those arguments are properly
resolved by voters in the national political process, not by the Court.
IV. POLICY
To say that something is constitutionally permissible is not to say
that it is prudent. In this part, we accordingly address the overfederaliza-
tion thesis from a policy perspective. We begin by deconstructing two of
the principal policy arguments of the overfederalization thesis. We con-
clude by offering a positive vision of the national government's proper
role in combating crime. Policy considerations, we argue, suggest that
crime has been underfederalized, not overfederalized. The national gov-
ernment should play a greater role in actual enforcement efforts than it
now does, especially respecting the violent street crime that ravages poor
urban areas.
A. THE BURDEN ON FEDERAL COURTS
Perhaps the principal policy argument against the federalization of
crime-fighting points to the alleged burdens that criminal caseloads im-
pose on the federal courts. 264 The result of these burdens, proponents of
the overfederalization thesis claim, is inefficiency and, very probably,
264 Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc[. 39 (1996); Oakley, supra note 1, at 59-62. Com-
plaints about the burden enforcing federal criminal law imposes on the federal courts are
hardly new. In 1925, for instance, Charles Warren decried "[the present congested condition
of the dockets of the Federal Courts and the small prospect of relief to the heavily burdened
Federal Judiciary, so long as Congress continue[d], every year, to expand the scope of the
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disaster. Recent increases in criminal filings coupled with the time pres-
sures of the Speedy Trial Act 265 are said to delay civil cases, especially
in districts with the heaviest drug offense dockets such as the Southern
District of Florida.266 The consequence, some proponents of the
overfederalization thesis warn, is nothing short of "the threat of the
breakdown of our federal civil justice system .... -267 Others are less
apocalyptic. They maintain that federal criminal cases, especially the
ones involving routine street crime, detract from the federal courts' spe-
cialized role of handling complex litigation 268 and deciding civil cases
that involve nationally important issues of federal constitutional and stat-
utory law.2 69 As appealing as they might be, these arguments rest on
incomplete and highly skewed presentations of the available empirical
data.270
body of Federal crimes .... Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts,
38 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1925).
265 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1985). The Act requires dismissal of charges that are not
brought to trial within 70 days of filing. This period may be tolled for a variety of reasons.
266 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 11; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note I, at 36;
Beale, supra note 1, at 985, 987-88; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1250-51; Mengler, supra note I,
at 506 n.23.
267 Kadish, supra note 1, at 1251. See also Brickey, supra note 1, at 1154 (describing
civil justice as "a casualty of the war on drugs"); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note I, at 36.
These various concerns even prompted Professor Beale to argue that continued federalization
of crime is not only unwise as a policy matter, but also threatens to impair the federal courts'
core constitutional functions. Beale, supra note 1, at 988-93.
268 Mengler, supra note 1, at 521.
269 Kadish, supra note 1, at 1251 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement that we
must "decide whether we want the federal courts to spend the majority of their time hearing
general criminal cases or whether we want the federal courts to occupy their traditional role as
a forum for civil disputes on nationally important issues such as commerce, constitutional
questions, civil rights and civil liberties").
270 Although one might respond to the alleged burden of deciding federal criminal cases
by increasing the number of federal judges, proponents of the overfederalization thesis main-
tain that this solution would be unacceptable. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note
1, at 7; Oakley, supra note 1, at 61 ("While the dilution of workload through the addition of
judges is always incrementally attractive, in the long run it will cause the present system to
collapse."); Beale, supra note 1, at 991-93; Wallace letter, supra note 1, at 741-42. According
to the Federal Courts Study Committee, for instance, an expansion in the number of federal
judges might well diminish the quality of the federal courts. Such an expansion, the Commit-
tee warns, would reduce the quality of federal judges by overloading the process surrounding
appointments and confirmations. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 1, at 7. See
also Beale, supra note 1, at 991-93. But see Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining
the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. Rsv. 67, 69-70 ("[The appointments process
plays only a small role in maintaining quality."); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 1, at 38
(dissenting statement of Dennis and Moorhead) ('The Federal Courts Study Committee should
be recommending more federal judgeships to create a greater capacity in our federal judiciary
to meet its responsibilities and leave the choice of forum to prosecutors."). Judges and aca-
demics have also warned that a larger federal judiciary would make the uniform interpretation
of federal law more difficult. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 1, at 7-8; Men-
gler, supra note 1, at 522-23; Beale, supra note 1, at 991-92.
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Consider the oft-repeated statistic that "federal criminal filings have
increased 70% since 1980."271 Because total federal criminal filings
were lower in that year than in any other year since 1917,272 using 1980
as a starting point is misleading. Moreover, the absolute number of crim-
inal filings is an exceedingly poor measure of the burden on federal
courts. One also must take into account the greatly expanded size of the
federal judiciary,273 whose growth has far exceeded that of the general
population.
As measured by trends in criminal filings per judgeship,274 the bur-
den of criminal filings on the federal courts has declined quite dramati-
cally. In 1905, for instance, there were 295 federal criminal cases filed
per judgeship. By 1925, during the height of Prohibition, the per judge-
ship criminal caseload averaged 544 cases. In 1945, the average criminal
caseload per judgeship was still 207 cases; twenty years later, in 1965,
the federal judiciary was responsible for some 115 criminal filings per
judgeship. In 1980, when federal criminal filings were at a sixty-plus
year low, the per-judgeship filings figure was 56 cases. After 1980, the
per-judgeship criminal case filings figure began to drift upward through-
out the 1980s to 69 cases in 1985 and 81 in 1990 before dropping to 71
in 1995. Expressed in terms of numbers of filings, the burden of crimi-
nal cases on individual federal judges has declined fairly steadily since
the turn of the century. In the 1980s and so far in the 1990s, that burden
has been less than in any decade since (at least) the turn of the century
and, as Figure 4 (below) shows, is less than half the level of the 1940s.275
271 See supra note 21.
272 See supra note 25.
273 From 1975 to 1995, the number of federal judges rose from 399 to 649. In addition,
although the total number of magistrate judges increased only slightly, the allocation of full-
time magistrate judges rose from 143 in 1975 to 416 in 1995. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note
1, at 11.
274 Except as noted, the term "judgeship" as used in this section refers to the number of
judgeships authorized by Congress in a given year. Judgeship figures from 1940-1995 include
the judges of territorial district courts. Neither active-status senior district judges nor federal
magistrate judges are counted in the Administrative Office's calculations of per judgeship
caseloads, even though both categories of judges are responsible for the disposition of large
numbers of criminal cases. In this respect, the critics' claims concerning judicial workloads
would appear to be even more exaggerated.
275 The overall trend remains the same if one focuses only on felony filings, which com-
pose about two thirds of the criminal caseload. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1995 REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 341-59 (no date of publication) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1995] (detailing
magistrate activities in federal fiscal year 1995). Between 1978 and 1995, the number of
felony filings in the federal district courts increased by about 31.5%. Judicial capacity, as
measured by the number of authorized district judgeships, increased in that interval from 399
judgeships to 649 - or by 63%. The result: a decline in the per-judgeship felony caseload
from 62 cases in 1978 to 50 cases in 1995. While it may be true that the number of felony
defendants prosecuted was slightly higher in 1995 than it was in 1978,.the total number of per-
judgeship felony defendants prosecuted actually declined from 87 in 1978 to 80 in 1995.
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Of course, an increase in complexity of federal criminal cases might
compensate somewhat for the striking historical decrease in the numbers
of filings per judge. Claims of increased complexity, however, are at
least exaggerated and quite probably wrong. Professor Beale, for exam-
ple, has noted that the number of defendants prosecuted per case - one
measure of case complexity - has risen in recent years. 276 Yet in 1945,
the number of defendants-per-case-filing was 1.6, and the fifty year aver-
age has been about 1.3. In this context, 1995's figure of 1.4 defendants
prosecuted per case filing is hardly a deviation from historical norms,
It would be misleading to focus only on felony filings when comparing the burden of
criminal cases on federal judges in the 1980s and subsequent years with the years prior to
1979. Until 1971, when the federal magistrates system was created, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82
Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060,
3401-02 (1992)), Article III judges were responsible for all misdemeanor and felony criminal
dispositions and most collateral matters associated with the criminal docket, save a handful of
selected matters that could be addressed by United States Commissioners. Until 1979, the role
of the magistrate was severely limited. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY (June
1993). Since that time, however, federal magistrates have assumed a significant share of the
duties once handled by the district judges. Federal magistrates were responsible, in 1995, for
the disposition of more than 46,000 matters deriving from the federal courts' criminal
caseload, including most pretrial matters associated with felony prosecutions and the final
disposition of virtually all petty offenses and misdemeanors.
276 Beale, supra note 264, at 45.
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and its departure from the historical mean is not statistically
significant.277
The available data also belie the contention that criminal trials im-
pose a larger burden on federal courts now than in the past. The Long
Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference, for example,
complained recently that "[i]n 1994, criminal filings were only 13 per-
cent of all filings, but 42 percent of all trials [sic]. '278 This complaint,
however, overlooks the more important fact that the number of criminal
trials 279 per judgeship has declined. In 1995, each federal judge, on aver-
age, conducted only seven criminal trials. 2 0 This is the lowest number
of almost any time in the last half-century and is roughly only one-third
of the twenty criminal trials conducted per federal judgeship in 1945.
That "the average length of a criminal jury trial has increased"281 matters
little given the fact that each federal judge, on average, tries so many
fewer criminal cases now.
Trends in the number of criminal filings, trials, and defendants pros-
ecuted per judgeship compellingly indicate that the burden criminal cases
impose on individual federal judges is far less now than in prior decades.
The number of criminal filings per judgeship has shown a striking and
steady pattern of decline since the turn of the century. The complexity of
each case, as measured by the number of defendants per case, has re-
mained relatively constant over the last half century. In fact, the declin-
ing number of criminal trials per judge tends to indicate that, on average,
each criminal case is less complex and less burdensome.282
277 The means discussed in this paragraph were obtained by averaging defendant- and
trial-related statistics from the administrative office of the United States Courts Annual Report.
278 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note I, at 12.
279 In about 1970, the Administrative Office (AO) changed the definition of "trial" for the
purposes of reporting the "total number of criminal trials" in table C-7 of its Annual Reports.
In the AO's reports since that time, the "total criminal trials" figure has included, inter alia,
suppression hearings handled by district judges, other contested pre-trial motions, and sentenc-
ing hearings. In this article, however, references to "criminal trials" and "criminal trials per
judgeship" contemplate "a proceeding commenced for the purpose of obtaining .... a verdict
in a criminal case" - that is, a trial on the merits. See, e.g., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1995, supra
note 275, at 361 (table T-l: showing federal court trial statistics for trials on the merits).
280 JUDIcAL BusiNm'ss 1995, supra note 275, at 361.
281 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 12.
282 Another strand of the "complexity" argument focuses on the case mix - that is, the
kinds of criminal cases that are filed today as compared with the past. For example, Professor
Beale has written:
The makeup of the federal criminal caseload has changed significantly, requiring
more judicial resources. The federal caseload in the early 1970s included a substan-
tial number of relatively straightforward offenses that could typically be disposed of
quickly, such as auto theft, forgery, counterfeiting, and selective service offenses.
These offenses accounted for roughly one quarter of all federal defendants charged
in 1972, but only 4 percent in 1992. During the same period, the percentage of
defendants charged with drug offenses grew from 18 to 41 percent.
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Far from justifying a shift of criminal cases from federal to state
courts, the available data point the other way, suggesting that the federal
criminal caseload could stand to be increased.
Criminal cases impose a much heavier burden on state judges than
on federal judges. According to the National Center for State Courts, the
average criminal caseload for state judges in courts of general jurisdic-
tion in 1990 was an extraordinary 406 criminal cases per judge, a
caseload that was five times higher than the federal judiciary's in the
same year.283 In 1994, the per-judge caseload in the state courts had
increased to 417 criminal cases, while the federal per-judgeship caseload
had dropped to 74.284 As the Center has noted, "[w]ith only 14 times as
many judges as the federal judiciary, the state general jurisdiction judici-
ary handles 90 times as many criminal cases .... ,,'285 Considering the
far lighter and declining criminal caseloads of federal judges, the daunt-
ing caseloads already managed by state judges strongly suggest that fed-
eral courts are not doing their fair share and that crime has been
underfederalized, not overfederalized.
Beale, supra note 264, at 48. At least three observations might be made about this statement.
First, Beale cites no authority for the proposition that "auto theft, forgery, counterfeiting, and
selective service offenses" are "relatively straightforward" and can "be disposed of quickly."
Second, the fact that the case mix has changed over time is not, in and of itself, evidence of
increased burdens, but only an indication of shifting law enforcement priorities fueled by the
demands of the public and the incidence of particular kinds of crime. Finally, to the extent that
Beale is claiming, as she clearly intends to, that federal criminal cases are more complex than
in the past, this fact would appear to fit precisely within the new federalists' position that the
federal courts' criminal jurisdiction should be reserved for only the most complex and "signifi-
cant" cases-such as major drug conspiracy cases: It is hardly a criticism that the federal
courts are "wasting their time" with minutiae.
Finally, Professor Beale and others have focused a substantial portion of their burdens'
related criticisms of the current national criminal justice role on the procedural requirements
and consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., id. at 48-50. Although the
demands that the Guidelines have ostensibly made on federal judicial resources may be a
reason to modify or eliminate the Guidelines, arguments of this variety have nothing whatso-
ever to do with the claim that criminal justice has been overfederalized.
283 OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 29, at 21.
284 Id.
285 Id. See also J. Anthony Kline, Commen: The Politicization of Crime, 46 HASTiNGS
L.J. 1087, 1088 (1995) (footnotes omitted):
The adverse impact of the extraordinary growth in the criminal caseloads of state
trial judges is that such judges lack the resources available to federal trial judges.
The federal judicial budget for the present year is about $2.9 billion, or roughly $4
million per federal judge. The California judiciary is about twice as large as the
federal judiciary, but its present annual budget, approximately $774 million, is less
than one-fourth the federal budget and amounts to less than $1 million per superior
court judge.
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B. TiH POLITICS OF CRIME
Judicial and academic hostility to recent federal crime legislation
partly flows from the sense that such legislation is the product of political
posturing and expediency.286 It is common knowledge that national pol-
iticians can reap significant political gains by enacting popular but
largely symbolic anti-crime measures. By doing so, they are able to
achieve the support of the voting public while antagonizing only
criminals, who have essentially no political clout, and perhaps also fed-
eral judges, who are few in number.287 Adherents of the overfederaliza-
tion thesis warn that the result of such tactics is the continual and undue
expansion of national criminal jurisdiction. To counteract the political
incentives facing national politicians, they suggest that states should have
exclusive authority over crime as a matter of policy and, perhaps, also as
a matter of constitutional law.
Although we largely accept this analysis of the underlying political
dynamic, the conclusion that it favors state over national authority does
not follow. State legislators face precisely the same incentives as federal
legislators. By embracing tough anti-crime symbolism, they, too, can
reap large political benefits at low political cost. Not surprisingly, many
of the federal statutes that judges and academics find objectionable, such
as the Gun-Free School Zones Act that Lopez invalidated, essentially
track laws widely adopted by the states.288 We share concern that anti-
crime measures too often reflect political grandstanding rather than a
careful and realistic balancing of costs and benefits. This problem, how-
ever, afflicts all levels of government, not just the national government; it
is a question of democratic government, not federalism. The political
incentives that proponents of the overfederalization thesis have spot-
lighted argue in favor of giving expert commissions and/or courts a
greater authority over the content of state and federal anti-crime legisla-
tion. However, neither as a matter of policy nor constitutional law do
political incentives justify vesting legislative jurisdiction exclusively
with the states rather than with both the states and the national
government.
The conclusions drawn by proponents of the overfederalization the-
sis are overbroad in an additional sense. In a democracy, the fact that
legislation is designed to curry favor with voters does not imply that it is
286 See, e.g., Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly, supra note 1, at 7; Brickey, supra note 1,
at 1165; Marshall, supra note 1, at 722-25; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1248-49; Mengler, supra
note I, at 529; Heymann & Moore, supra note 1, at 111-12.
287 Mengler, supra note 1, at 529-30.
288 See supra note 208 (43 states had adopted laws similar to Gun-Free School Zones
Act). See also supra note 222 and accompanying text (46 States have laws identical or similar
to Megan's law); supra note 239 (at least 42 states have criminalized willful failure to pay
child support).
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wrongheaded or unconstitutional. As a result of the widespread public
concern over crime and support for efforts to combat it, national politi-
cians do have strong incentives to expand the national criminal jurisdic-
tion. That, however, does not supply a reason for concluding that the
expansion is a bad thing. In fact, in a democracy, legislative responsive-
ness to widely shared views strongly supports the opposite conclusion.
C. A POSITIVE VISION
As a matter of policy, what is the best mix of state and national
jurisdiction over crime? We believe the answer should reflect federal-
ism's underlying values. Those values not only have constitutional stat-
ure, but also embrace important policy considerations such as
responsiveness and efficiency. It would be foolish, of course, to suppose
that federalism's values yield a uniquely correct level of national inter-
vention or dictate the ideal balance between national funding and en-
forcement efforts. Nonetheless, they do support the general conclusions
that the national government's criminal jurisdiction should be wide-rang-
ing, that the various rationales for national intervention should be incor-
porated into investigative and prosecutorial guidelines, but should not be
judicially enforceable, and that the national share of enforcement efforts
should be increased, particularly with respect to violent street crime in
poor urban neighborhoods.
1. The Scope of National Criminal Jurisdiction
Given that the various rationales for national authority transcend of-
fenses, 289 Lopez, lower courts, and the proponents of the overfederaliza-
tion thesis err in seeking to limit national jurisdiction to fewer offenses.
Nonetheless, concluding that national criminal jurisdiction should en-
compass a broad array of offenses leaves open the possibility that this
jurisdiction should be limited in other ways.
As an alternative to limiting national jurisdiction to a relatively
short list of offenses, the scope of national jurisdiction might be tied to
the various rationales for national intervention. Under this approach,
federal investigators and prosecutors could pursue a case within any cate-
gory of offenses, but only by showing a need for national intervention.
The various rationales for national intervention could be codified into
statutes, and courts could make case-by-case jurisdictional determina-
tions based upon them.
This approach for limiting the national criminal jurisdiction is far
more attractive than the approach proposed by the proponents of the
overfederalization thesis. It is undoubtedly true that having federal offi-
289 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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cials consider the various rationales for national intervention would im-
prove the exercise of national jurisdiction. The Department of Justice
should incorporate these rationales into its internal guidelines and require
that federal law enforcement agencies and federal prosecutors consider
them when they decide when and how to supplement state enforcement
efforts.290
For a variety of reasons, however, it would be unwise to give courts
authority to police adherence to these rationales. First, forcing federal
investigators and prosecutors to demonstrate the presence of these ratio-
nales to a judge would unduly restrict the exercise of concurrent national
authority. For example, one of the rationales for national intervention,
which is based on the states' tendency to ignore the out-of-state benefits
of their enforcement efforts, does not lend itself to case-by-case show-
ings because this rationale predicts that states will choose a suboptimal
level of enforcement across-the-board. 291 Second, case-by-case show-
ings of a need for national intervention raise issues of workability and
judicial competence. How would courts give content to and enforce the
redistributive rationale for national intervention? How would courts
judge the relative efficiency of state and national enforcement? Third,
limiting national jurisdiction to the demonstrated presence of particular
factors would lead to costly litigation over issues of jurisdiction.
While precipitating these costs, the determinations of jurisdiction
discussed above are not necessary to advance important countervailing
values. As we have seen, the typical rationales for exclusive state juris-
diction have little application to crime-fighting and, on balance, actually
provide general support for concurrent national authority. 292 In addition,
state courts and judges confront far greater caseloads than do federal
courts and judges. 293
These various considerations undercut the proposal to require a
demonstrated need for national intervention in each case. Instead, they
suggest that national jurisdiction should be defined broadly, leaving the
wise use of such jurisdiction in individual cases to federal police and
290 See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Reporters' Draft for the Working Group on
Federal-State Cooperation, 46 HASTINGS W. 1319 (1995). Courts have held that the Justice
Department's internal guidelines do not create judicially enforceable rights. See United States
v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084,
1120 (3d Cir. 1990).
291 As for efficiency, the exercise of national authority might be more efficient even in the
absence of any efficiency consideration that might be specified in a statute. In the course of
investigating a multistage drug ring, for example, federal law enforcement agents might stum-
ble upon an unrelated murder. Even though there is no need for interstate coordination, spe-
cialized resources, or harsher punishment, the murder might be more efficiently investigated
and prosecuted at the federal level.
292 See infra Part III.A.
293 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors. Although the rationales for national support should be in-
corporated into internal investigative and prosecutorial guidelines, they
should not be converted into judicially enforceable rules.
2. The Exercise of National Jurisdiction
Concurrent jurisdiction in a particular area does not mean that the
national government should always or routinely exercise its jurisdiction.
The national government, in fact, has been very selective about exercis-
ing its concurrent jurisdiction.294 As Congress has expanded the list of
activities over which the national system has concurrent authority, the
national share of enforcement activity has actually diminished (and ac-
counts for less than 10% of all such activity).295
Policy considerations suggest some conclusions regarding the ap-
propriate exercise of national criminal jurisdiction. Some of these con-
clusions largely confirm the wisdom of existing practices; others require
important changes.
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion is that, within the area of con-
current jurisdiction, national enforcement efforts should be substantially
guided by efficiency considerations. National enforcement efforts are
thus warranted where a need exists for interstate coordination, special-
ized resources, or the harsher penalties associated with the federal sen-
tencing guidelines. To a significant degree, existing patterns of national
enforcement probably conform with this conclusion. 296
A second conclusion also supports existing practices: national
criminal jurisdiction is appropriately used to respond to crime that the
public regards especially serious. National criminal jurisdiction has al-
ways been sensitive to changing public preoccupations. While auto theft
prosecutions accounted for a significant percentage of federal filings in
the 1960s, drug prosecutions have accounted for an increasing share of
federal filings over the last fifteen years. 297 In the early 1930s, Congress
294 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 16 ("The virtually unlimited power of the na-
tional government both to enter the field and to exclude other levels of government is exer-
cised with extraordinary restraint under current conditions of American justice."); Jeffries &
Gleeson, supra note 20, at 1098-1101.
295 See supra Part I; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 16.
296 In a recent article, for example, two federal prosecutors report that the Department of
Justice's prosecutorial criteria respecting the Child Support Recovery Act "are designed to
target the few cases that states are unable to handle because of interstate barriers" and that
"[the Department filed charges under the ... Act against 28 persons" in 1994. Gorelick &
Litman, supra note 165, at 975. See also id. at 976 (noting that the "Department's
prosecutorial policy emphasizes ... allocation of criminal justice resources according to the
comparative advantage of the federal, state and local governments") (emphasis in original);
Litman & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1325-26 (discussing the joint state-federal Triggerlock
program and the Anti-Violence Initiative).
297 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note I, at 695.
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responded to widespread public concern over the kidnaping of Charles
Lindbergh's baby by making kidnaping a federal offense in certain cir-
cumstances. 298 In the 1990s, Congress similarly responded to a few hor-
rific and widely publicized accounts of carijacking by making the crime a
federal offense.299 As these exchanges illustrate, national law enforce-
ment efforts reflect and respond to changing public perceptions.
The conventional legal wisdom is sharply critical of the use of na-
tional criminal jurisdiction to accommodate what it characterizes as
fickle political fashion. Proponents of the overfederalization thesis main-
tain that the national government has become over-involved in drug of-
fenses.300 They also object to creating federal offenses simply because
the public believes that they address important problems, such as
carjacking or violence against women.30 1
One can easily criticize the merits of the public's crime-fighting pri-
orities. For instance, some scholars have made impressive arguments
that these priorities rely too heavily on incarceration. 30 2 Overcriminal-
ization, however, is not overfederalization. Federalism emphasizes the
proper distribution of jurisdiction at all levels between the national and
state criminal justice systems, not the proper overall level of resources
devoted to particular uses of this jurisdiction. Even if the public decided
to decriminalize drug use or shift resources from punishment to preven-
tion, questions of federalism would arise and remain almost entirely in-
dependent of the merit of these policy shifts. The public's current crime-
fighting priorities might be misplaced, but no policy relating to federal-
ism condemns the supplemental use of national power for their
implementation.
Indeed, from the standpoint of federalism, national enforcement ef-
forts should be guided partly by the priority the public attaches to partic-
ular kinds of crime, such as street crime and domestic violence. Drugs,
domestic violence, and carijacking each carry significant national eco-
nomic consequences. While there are no strong arguments for exclusive
state authority over these matters, considerable justification exists for a
298 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 266.
299 See supra notes 216, 218-19, and accompanying text. For a discussion of impetus for
the federal carIjacking statute, see Brickey, supra note 1, at 1162 n.154; Zimring & Hawkins,
supra note 1, at 20; ANi CAR THEFr Acr OF 1992, H.R. REP, No. 102-851, pt. 2, at 14-15
(1992).
300 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 1, at 1251; Miner, supra note 19, at 683. See also supra
note 190.
301 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 1, at 734-37; Kadish, supra note 1, at 1249; Zimring &
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 20-21.
302 For examples arguing, inter alia, that recent public priorities have resulted in the
overuse of incarceration, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoPD HAwKINS, INCAPACITATION
(1995); MicHAE. TONRY, MAuGN N GL.cr - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1995).
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concurrent national role. As we have seen, the tendency of states to
overlook the out-of-state benefits of law enforcement suggests that indi-
vidual states will choose a suboptimal level of enforcement across-the-
board.30 3 Given the limitations on, and alternative uses of, national re-
sources, the national government obviously will not and cannot become
equally involved in all areas. Decisions must be made about where to
concentrate supplemental national enforcement. In a democracy, it is de-
sirable for these decisions to be made, in part, in accordance with which
types of crime the public regards as particularly serious and threatening.
Federalism-based policies lead to a third conclusion, which, unlike
the first two, would require a rethinking and reformulation of current
practices: the violent street crime that afflicts poor neighborhoods
should be one of the primary targets of supplemental national funding
and enforcement. We can now draw together the three separate lines of
inquiry, each of which lead to this conclusion. To begin, the public re-
gards street crime as particularly threatening and, as we have seen, public
priorities appropriately influence the allocation of national enforcement
resources. In addition, the national government's accepted role in pro-
moting racial equality can help sustain a national focus on street crime,
which disproportionately besets African-American communities. Fi-
nally, the redistributive rationale for national authority also applies. It is
widely recognized in other contexts that states have great difficulty in
adopting redistributive measures and that, where redistribution is desira-
ble, a need for national intervention exists. 30 4 It is widely overlooked,
however, that eradicating street crime in poor neighborhoods entails just
such a redistribution and that, consequently, a special need for supple-
mental national involvement exists.
In addition to standing conventional legal wisdom on its head,30 5 the
conclusion that the national government has an important role to play in
combating street crime in poor neighborhoods would require some
changes at the level of enforcement practices. Some national enforce-
ment efforts are consistent with this role. The Department of Justice, for
example, has formed joint state, local, and federal law enforcement task
forces to combat, inter alia, gang-related crimes.306 Such cooperative
303 See supra Part III.B.4.a.
304 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
305 It is true that many proponents of the overfederalization thesis affirm a national role in
combating the drug problem, which tends to be especially severe in poor areas. But they see
this national role as flowing solely from the national government's greater efficiency in inves-
tigating interstate conspiracies or handling especially complex cases. See supra note 190. The
conventional legal wisdom sees no justification for national intervention that extends beyond
interjurisdictional drug rings to violent street crime. See id. and accompanying text. Indeed, it
views street crime as paradigmatically inappropriate for national intervention. See supra notes
2, 59, 190, and accompanying text.
306 See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 165, at 970, 977.
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combinations of local and national officials can serve as a model for
increased national efforts to fight street crime in poor areas. Other na-
tional efforts, however, are not consistent with a supplemental national
role that accords some priority to fighting this crime. The 1994 Crime
Control Act, for instance, provides funds for hiring additional police of-
ficers, but contains no preference for poor neighborhoods.30 7 There is no
articulated national policy, at either the legislative or law enforcement
levels, of giving some priority to combating crime in poor neighbor-
hoods. Federalism considerations suggest the need for such an articula-
tion and for a concomitant redirection of enforcement efforts based upon
this priority.
Federalism-based policies also suggest a fourth and final conclu-
sion: The national government should increase its share of enforcement
activities. This conclusion flows from two sources. One is the evidence
that the relative national role in enforcing the criminal law has been di-
minishing since the 1930s.30 As a result of technological changes and
the increased interdependence of American life during that period, more
crime crosses state borders, specialized law enforcement technology and
expertise have wider application, enforcement produces more spillover
benefits in other states, and the pressures of the race-to-the-bottom are
intensified. In short, the need for national intervention now extends to a
greater share of criminal activity. Federalism-based considerations sug-
gest that the national role should increase, not decrease.
The far heavier criminal caseloads faced by state courts and
judges309 also indicate a need for a greater national role. The more bur-
dened state criminal justice systems tend to confirm the hypothesis, sug-
gested by the theory of federalism, that States alone will not devote
adequate resources to enforcement. These burdens also strongly indicate
the need for increased national enforcement and funding. The national
government is currently not doing its fair share in addressing a problem
that afflicts both individual communities and the nation as whole.
CONCLUSION
On the levels of empirical fact, constitutional law, and social policy,
the current legal thought on and off the Supreme Court has matters ex-
307 The Act requires that 50% of the grant funds be allocated to local governments having
populations of 150,000 people or less. 42 U.S.C. § 3793(l 1)(B) (1994). See VIOLENT CRIME
CONTROL AND LAw ENFORCEMENT AcT OF 1994, H.R. REP.' No. 103-324 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1813 (additional views of Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y.) (objecting to
channeling 60% of the funds to local governments having populations of 100,000 or less be-
cause "it would deny the larger cities, which have the most severe crime problems and in
which police departments are stretched thinnest, from access to most of the grant money").
308 See supra Part I.
309 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
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actly backwards. The empirical evidence shows that since the 1930s, the
national share in the exercise of crime-fighting authority has been de-
creasing, not increasing. As for the Constitution, it establishes no pre-
sumption in favor of exclusive state authority over crime control. The
constitutional values of federalism, which are the only sources from
which the Constitution's meaning now can be gleaned, decisively sup-
port a concurrent national role in enforcing a broad array of offenses. In
addition, policy considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the na-
tional government's crime-fighting role should be pared down. They in-
stead suggest the need to increase the national share of enforcement.
This conclusion is especially true with respect to violent street crime in
poor neighborhoods, which is precisely the kind of crime that the Justices
and other legal elites most strongly believe should be left to the states.
Whether due to disagreement with the merits of existing crime-
fighting priorities, unstated concerns over civil liberties, or undue sensi-
tivity to the parochial interests of the federal judiciary, the conventional
legal wisdom overlooks the lofty appeal of the concurrent national role
we have outlined. Crime-fighting efforts, in general, have the unequivo-
cal support of the public nationwide. Due to this nationwide consensus
and the concomitant popular support for joint state and federal efforts,
crime is one arena in which cooperative federalism can work best.
Crime limits the opportunities of both its actual and potential victims,
particularly in the poor urban areas where we have argued national sup-
port should be concentrated. Federalism-based considerations suggest
that the national government should increase its share of enforcement
efforts in a way that advances its historic and inspiring role of promoting
equality of opportunity along income and racial lines.
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